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INTRUDERS IN THE BOARDROOM: THE CASE 
OF CONSTITUENCY DIRECTORS 
SIMONE M. SEPE
 
ABSTRACT 
Under current fiduciary rules, directors who fail to maintain an 
undivided loyalty to common shareholders are essentially “intruders,” 
exposed to shareholder retribution and liability for breach of fiduciary 
duty.  
This Article argues that the increasing appointment of “constituency 
directors” has made the fiduciary principle of undivided loyalty to the 
common shareholders both outdated and normatively undesirable. A 
“constituency director” is a director designated to the board by a 
particular constituency (or “sponsor”). These constituency directors are 
generally appointed to advocate for investors who are not common 
shareholders, such as preferred shareholders, creditors, unions, and even 
the federal government. Contrary to conventional scholarly accounts, 
these kinds of investors (non-common equity, or “NCE,” investors) cannot 
always fully protect their interests through contracting alone. Thus, 
constituency directors are appointed to gain access to the added 
safeguards that only direct board advocacy can provide. By remedying 
this condition of “contractual failure,” constituency directors make NCE 
investments worth undertaking where they otherwise might not be.  
This analysis suggests that the liability constituency directors face 
under current fiduciary rules may reduce a corporation’s access to 
important sources of capital. Hence, there is a normative case to be made 
for turning a director’s obligation of undivided loyalty to the common 
shareholders into a default rule. This reform would allow constituency 
directors to properly advocate for their sponsors, bridging the gap 
between corporate practice and corporate law, to the benefit of all 
involved parties and society as a whole.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Just as soon-to-be Americans are required to take an “Oath of 
Allegiance” to the country that has granted them citizenship,1 so too are 
individuals appointed to a corporation’s board of directors required to 
subjugate their partisan interests to those of the corporation’s common 
shareholders.
 
No divided loyalties are permitted in the boardroom, 
regardless of how (or by whom) a director is designated.
2
 Directors who 
fail to maintain an undivided loyalty to the common shareholders are 
essentially “intruders,” exposed to shareholder retribution and liability for 
breach of fiduciary duty.
3
  
This Article argues that the increasing appointment of “constituency 
directors” exposes flaws in the current law of fiduciary duty. The 
requirement that all directors be loyal to none but the common 
shareholders is no longer practically or normatively justified. This is not to 
 
 
 1. See 8 C.F.R. § 337.1 (2008) (requiring soon-to-be-naturalized citizens to solemnly repeat the 
following language: “I hereby declare, on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all 
allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty, of whom or which I have 
heretofore been a subject or citizen . . . ”). Taking the Oath of Allegiance is a mandatory requirement 
for naturalization that officially implies a renunciation of one’s previous citizenship. See Immigration 
and Nationality Act of 1952 § 337, 8 U.S.C. § 1448(b) (2012). However, the renunciation-related 
language of the Oath of Allegiance currently lacks effective enforcement so that, in practice, the 
United States allows dual citizenship if compatible with the laws of one’s country of origin. See Karin 
Scherner-Kim, The Role of the Oath of Renunciation in Current U.S. National Policy—to Enforce, to 
Omit, or Maybe to Change?, 88 GEO. L.J. 329, 329–33 (2000); see also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Advice 
About Possible Loss of U.S. Citizenship and Dual Nationality, TRAVEL.STATE.GOV, http://travel 
.state.gov/law/citizenship/citizenship_778.html (last updated Jan. 11, 2013) (State Department 
acknowledgment that Americans may have other nationalities). Some scholars have argued that the 
U.S.’s novel toleration of dual nationality rightfully reflects changes in international relationships—
which have eliminated many of the concerns historically associated with this status—as well as 
increasing globalization. See Peter J. Spiro, Dual Nationality and the Meaning of Citizenship, 46 
EMORY L.J. 1411, 1416, 1461–63 (1997). Unfortunately, no similar effort has been made to take into 
account changed corporate relationships and business practices with respect to the divided loyalty 
issues that arise in the corporate context and are the focus of this Article. 
 2. See infra note 142 and accompanying text. 
 3. It is worth emphasizing at the outset of this Article’s discussion that Delaware courts have 
generally restricted access to fiduciary benefits only to the common shareholders, excluding other 
classes of shareholders from fiduciary protection. See, e.g., Solomon v. Armstrong, 747 A.2d 1098, 
1124 (Del. Ch. 1999) (dismissing fiduciary claims by tracking shareholders (i.e., holders of equity 
claims tied to the performance of specific corporate assets) on the ground that conflicts among 
different shareholder classes are better dealt with contractually). In particular, Delaware courts have 
historically denied preferred shareholders the benefit of extra-contractual protection, admitting few 
exceptions to this long-standing position. See, e.g., Wood v. Coastal States Gas Corp., 401 A.2d 932 
(Del. 1979) (opining that preferred shareholders’ participation rights are limited to those included in 
the articles of incorporation); Judah v. Delaware Trust Co., 378 A.2d 624, 628 (Del. 1977) (similarly 
limiting the rights of preferred shareholders to those provided for by the certificate of incorporation). 
See also infra note 158 and accompanying text (discussing recent cases on the preferred shareholders’ 
corporate position). 
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say this rule of fiduciary duty should be discarded. Rather, it should be 
viewed as the default, around which corporate parties may contract to 
further all parties’ interests. 
A constituency director is a director appointed to a board specifically to 
advance the interest of a certain constituency (the “sponsor” or the 
“designating investor”). These directors are most commonly appointed to 
represent investors who are not common shareholders,
4
 such as preferred 
shareholders, creditors, unionized workers,
5
 or even the federal 
government. This Article will refer to such classes of investors as “non-
common equity” (“NCE”). NCE investors rely on the wide-ranging 
control over corporate affairs that only a director can exercise, in situations 
where contracting alone is inadequate to fully protect their interests. 
However, under current fiduciary rules, constituency directors who 
advocate for NCE investors face liability for breaching their obligation to 
be loyal only to common shareholders. But if NCE investors cannot gain 
the protections that constituency directors provide, such investors may 
decline to invest at all, reducing a corporation’s access to NCE capital. In 
tough economic times such as the present, this is especially harmful.  
Under the canonical view of corporate governance,
6
 the fiduciary 
principle of undivided loyalty is justified as the necessary response to the 
severe contracting difficulties shareholders
7
 face in addressing problems of 
 
 
 4. Controlling shareholders or other particular classes of common shareholders also 
occasionally have recourse to specially appointed board designees. See Cyril Moscow, The 
Representative Director Problem, 16 INSIGHTS 12, 13 (June 2002). However, the appointment of this 
special group of constituency directors involves conflicts among investors sharing homogenous 
economic interests. Instead, the focus of this Article is on the appointment of constituency directors as 
a means to address conflicts among investors with divergent economic interests.  
 5. Workers, or employees, are investors in the sense that they contribute labor in exchange for 
the right to a fixed claim that has priority in the order of payment. See William A. Klein, The Modern 
Business Organization: Bargaining Under Constraints, 91 YALE L.J. 1521, 1532 (1982); Frank H. 
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1447 (1989) 
(“Holding firm-specific human capital is a way of investing in the firm.”). Moreover, in today’s 
corporate environment, unions, as representatives of employees and workers, increasingly act as 
business entities that provide a variety of services to both their members and corporations. See 
Matthew T. Bodie, Mother Jones Meets Gordon Gekko: The Complicated Relationship Between Labor 
and Private Equity, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1317, 1353 (2008) (“We need to recognize that unions, like 
their negotiating counterparts, are in business.”); see also infra note 117 (discussing unions’ 
management of employees’ health and welfare trusts in the automotive industry). 
 6. See infra note 29. 
 7. For convenience, this Article will hereinafter use the term “shareholders” to refer exclusively 
to the common shareholders, consistently with Delaware courts’ treatment of this shareholder class as 
the sole class that is entitled to fiduciary protection. As mentioned supra note 3, Delaware courts have 
generally restricted access to fiduciary benefits only to the common shareholders, excluding other 
classes of shareholders from fiduciary protection. 
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managerial opportunism.
8
 Indeed, as residual corporate claimants who 
bear the risk of failure and receive the marginal rewards of success, 
shareholders are concerned with all management actions.
9
 This makes it 
unfeasible for them to control a manager’s opportunistic behaviors solely 
through contracting because management of corporate affairs involves 
continuous decision-making. The right to elect the board of directors and 
the benefit of fiduciary protection are the mechanisms the law provides to 
address this condition of “contractual failure.”10 By vesting shareholders 
with the power to make adaptive (i.e., non-contractually specified) 
decisions—in the jargon of economists, residual control rights11—these 
mechanisms provide the added safeguards shareholders need to fully 
protect their corporate interests. 
 
 
 8. Famously articulated by Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means over eighty years ago, the 
problem of managerial opportunism arises out of the separation of ownership from control that 
characterizes the modern corporation with dispersed shareholders. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & 
GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 86–88 (1933). Michael 
Jensen and William Meckling subsequently formalized the shareholder-manager conflict in their 
agency theory of the firm. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 309, 312–19 
(1976). See also infra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing the various forms managerial 
opportunism vis-à-vis shareholders can take). 
 9. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 
395, 404 (1983) (suggesting that shareholders’ corporate position is unique because they are the only 
corporate constituency with a meaningful interest in every decision a solvent firm makes). 
 10. See Oliver E. Williamson, Corporate Boards of Directors: In Principle and in Practice, 24 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 247, 248–50 (2007) (describing the board as a means to provide “credible 
contracting support” to equity investments); Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 
1197, 1198–99 (1984) (suggesting that a condition of “contractual failure” justifies the attribution of 
board representation to corporate participants); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 91 (1991) (emphasizing that shareholders “receive few 
explicit promises. Instead they get the right to vote and the protection of fiduciary principles. . . .”); 
Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737, 751–52 
(1997) (arguing that because shareholders can be more easily expropriated than other investors, “[t]o 
induce them to invest in the first place, they need stronger protections, such as the duty of loyalty.”).  
 11. Viewed through this lens, the shareholder franchise and fiduciary protection can be described 
as corporate law institutions implementing the theoretical predicate of the property right theory of the 
firm elaborated in the seminal work of economists Sanford Grossman, Oliver Hart, and John Moore. 
See Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical 
and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and 
the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119 (1990). Under this theory, when it is too costly for a 
party to negotiate for specific rights over another party’s assets, it may be optimal to assign that party 
property rights giving her the power to exercise residual control over the assets. See Grossman & Hart, 
supra, at 692. Within this theoretical framework, the right to exercise residual control (over an asset) is 
defined as “the right to control all aspects of the asset that have not been explicitly given away by 
contract.” Grossman & Hart, supra, at 695.  
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As a corollary, NCE investors are not entitled to these sorts of 
additional protections. This is because, as fixed corporate claimants,
12
 they 
are concerned with a more limited set of management actions and, 
therefore, theoretically, in a position to protect their interests by 
negotiating for specific contractual protections (i.e., specific control 
rights).
13
  
While dominant in both legal doctrine and mainstream academic 
theories, this view reflects a corporate paradigm that has fallen out of step 
with the reality of an increasingly large share of U.S. corporations. Under 
this paradigm, equity is the principal source of capital,
14
 company 
information is generally publicly available,
15
 and the bottom-line 
protection for NCE investments comes from a corporation’s net worth 
(i.e., the margin by which corporate assets exceeds corporate liabilities)
 
,
16
 
in addition to the ability to quickly exit a corporate investment.
17
 But these 
assumptions are no longer generally applicable. In fact, none of these 
attributes are present in either venture-backed startups or declining 
 
 
 12. Similarly to creditors and workers, preferred shareholders can be described as fixed claimants 
to the extent that their payoff structure provides for the payment of fixed dividends and priority over 
common shares, as is most commonly the case. See ANDREW METRICK & AYAKO YASUDA, VENTURE 
CAPITAL & THE FINANCE OF INNOVATION 163–72 (Lacey Vitetta ed., 2d ed. 2011) (observing that all 
the various forms of preferred shares used in venture capital investments have concave (i.e., debt-like) 
features that make their holders highly sensitive to declines in asset value); Michael C. Jensen, Agency 
Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 324 (1986) 
(comparing the disciplining effects that both debt and preferred shares with fixed dividends have on 
management). 
 13. See Grossman & Hart, supra note 11, at 602 (defining specific control rights as the 
contractually specified rights a party reserves over an asset).  
 14. See Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10, 
10 (1991) (describing the need to raise huge amounts of equity capital as one of the technological 
changes that explains the rise of the modern corporation); Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate 
Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927, 1933 (1993) (same). 
 15. See Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search 
for Hidden Value, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 521, 529 (2002) (describing the “visible value” model of the 
corporation as the standard among legal and finance scholars). Under this model, inside (i.e., private) 
information is limited in importance and economic significance, short lived, and can easily be made 
publicly available. See id. at 529–30. 
 16. The common inclusion in debt contracts of covenants that require a corporation’s net worth 
to exceed some minimum level is premised on this assumption. See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF 
CORPORATE FINANCE 85 (2006).  
 17.  Pursuant to Hirschman’s classic taxonomy of organizational means, exit allows individual 
members to terminate their relationship with an organization by withdrawing their participation. See 
ALBERT O. HIRSHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRM, 
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 30 (1970). On the premise of the marketability of NCE investors’ 
claims (regardless of whether these claims take the form of securities or investments in human capital), 
the classical paradigm of the corporation assumes that exit is always available to protect the interests 
of NCE investors. See also infra text accompanying notes 95–96 (discussing the implication of the 
threat of exit). 
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corporations—both of which are growing exponentially in importance in 
the U.S. economy.
18
 Instead, such corporations are characterized by 
significant, company-specific information available only to management, 
low net worth, and high asset specificity (i.e., limited exit rights).
19
 
Because under these investment features investors tend to undervalue 
straight equity claims, NCE capital is often a primary source of funding.
20
 
Given the attributes that characterize these kinds of corporations, the 
apparently bright line that separates the contracting positions of 
shareholders and other capital providers begins to blur. NCE investors 
become potentially as sensitive to management actions—and, therefore, as 
exposed to contractual incompleteness issues—as shareholders. As a 
result, the ability of the contract alone to support NCE investments 
radically decreases, threatening the viability of such investments.  
NCE investors thus appoint designated individuals to the board—
constituency directors—to provide added safeguards and adaptive 
responses that cannot be secured through contract alone. For example, 
venture capitalists and private equity funds routinely seek representation 
on, if not control of, the boards of the startups they finance.
21
 Creditors do 
the same, in an attempt to protect their interests in declining 
corporations.
22
 Unions may also demand board representation in exchange 
for wage or other concessions to financially troubled corporations.
23
  
 
 
 18. A recent study by the National Venture Capital Association found that “[t]he 500 largest 
public companies with venture roots” had a market capitalization of $2.8 trillion in 2010. NAT’L 
VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, VENTURE IMPACT: THE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF VENTURE CAPITAL-
BACKED COMPANIES TO THE U.S. ECONOMY 4 (6th ed. 2011), available at http://www.nvca.org/ 
index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=786 (last visited Dec. 30, 2013). The 
study also found that “[f]or every dollar of venture capital invested from 1970 to 2010, $6.27 of 
revenue was generated in 2010.” Id. at 2. Investments in distressed debt have also grown into “a 
critical component of the U.S. capital markets,” especially in the aftermath of the recent financial 
crisis. Stephen G. Moyer et al., A Primer on Distressed Investing: Buying Companies by Acquiring 
Their Debt, 24 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., no. 4, 2012, at 59; see also Stuart Gilson, Coming Through in a 
Crisis: How Chapter 11 and the Debt Restructuring Industry Are Helping to Revive the U.S. Economy, 
24 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., no. 4, 2012, at 23 (suggesting that the reorganization of distressed debt has 
had a fundamental impact in facilitating economic recovery after the financial crisis). It is also worth 
emphasizing that a growing share of venture capital investments takes the form of investments in 
distressed debt by so-called vulture funds. For a thorough description of U.S. vulture investing, see 
HILARY ROSENBERG, THE VULTURE INVESTORS (revised ed. 2000). 
 19. See infra Part I.B.2.  
 20. Cf. Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions 
When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 187 (1984) (exposing a 
pecking-order theory of corporate structures, under which in conditions of informational asymmetry, 
internal financing is preferred to debt claims and debt claims are preferred to straight equity).  
 21. See infra Part I.C.1.  
 22. See infra notes 109–10 and accompanying text.  
 23. See infra notes 111–17 and accompanying text.  
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Yet the most innovative use of constituency directors has emerged in 
connection with the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) that the U.S. 
Treasury employed to rescue troubled financial institutions during the 
financial crisis of 2007–2009.24 In providing preferred stock financing to 
distressed financial institutions, the Treasury expressly bargained for the 
right to appoint board members in case of missed repayment deadlines. In 
implementing this provision, the Treasury has so far elected twenty-six 
board members to a total of fifteen financial institutions, including 
financial giant AIG.
25
  
The existence of constituency directors, however, becomes problematic 
when those directors are also expected to abide by the principle of 
undivided loyalty to shareholders. If a conflict arises between the interests 
of the sponsor and the shareholders, the law currently requires that the 
interests of shareholders dominate, unless the sponsor has bargained for a 
specific course of action in her favor.
26
 However, this is antithetical to the 
task NCE investors appoint constituency directors to perform, which is 
precisely to gain control over the corporate affairs beyond whatever 
contractual protections have been negotiated.
27
  
 
 
 24. See infra notes 118–25 and accompanying text.  
 25. Specifically, the government has so far replaced twenty-four directors in fourteen troubled 
financial institutions that were rescued under the TARP’s Capital Purchase Program, U.S. DEP’T OF 
THE TREASURY, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM (TARP): MONTHLY REPORT TO CONGRESS—
OCTOBER 2012 9 (Nov. 9, 2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/ 
reports/Documents/October%202012%20Monthly%20Report.pdf [hereinafter TREASURY REPORT TO 
CONGRESS—OCT. 2012], and two directors at AIG, which was rescued under the TARP’s 
Systemically Significant Failing Institutions Program. Press Release, AIG, U.S. Treasury Appoints 
Two Directors to AIG Board of Directors (Apr. 1, 2010), available at http://phx.corporate-
ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=76115&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1409189&highlight= [hereinafter AIG-Press 
Release]. 
 26. Today more than ever, the courts of Delaware insist that all directors must be loyal only to 
the common shareholders. Beginning with the 2009 groundbreaking ruling in In re Trados 
Incorporated Shareholder Litigation, Delaware courts have moved beyond prior flat recitations of the 
undivided loyalty principle and made clear that a director’s discretionary decision-making power can 
only be exercised for the benefit of the common shareholders, regardless of whether a director has 
been designated by a different corporate constituency, such as the preferred shareholders. In re Trados 
Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 1512-CC, 2009 WL 2225958, (Del. Ch. July 24, 2009); see also infra Part 
II.A.2–3 (discussing the Trados decision, and its social welfare implications, in detail). It also bears 
emphasis that, while a recent post-trial decision exculpated the Trados directors from liability for 
breach of fiduciary duties, in that decision the Delaware Court of Chancery reiterated the principle that 
the right to benefit from directors’ discretionary decision-making only pertains to the common 
shareholders. See In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 1512-VCL, 2013 WL 4511262, at *18 (Del. 
Ch. Aug. 16, 2013).  
 27. It is important to observe that the residual control NCE investors purport to obtain through 
the appointment of constituency directors entails both the right to exercise adaptive decision-making 
and the benefit of continuous, and timely, access to private company information. See infra Part I.C.3.  
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These limitations do not simply create legal risks for NCE investors; 
they interfere with welfare maximization. Current doctrines tend to focus 
on the ex post consequences of vesting constituency directors with the 
power to exercise discretionary decision-making at the potential expense 
of shareholders. This focus overlooks the fact that, from an ex ante 
perspective, these contracting models solve the first-order problem of 
making NCE capital available to shareholders where it otherwise would 
not be, thus serving, rather than jeopardizing, shareholder interests and the 
interest of society as a whole.
28
 Assuming that welfare-maximization is a 
normative goal of the law of fiduciary duty, there is then a case to be made 
for turning the principle of undivided loyalty into a default. Corporate 
actors should be enabled to bargain out of this principle by appointing 
constituency directors, and thus encourage investments that might 
otherwise be withheld. 
This Article’s discussion of constituency directors proceeds in three 
Parts. Part I discusses the rise of constituency directors and analyzes the 
fundamental role these actors play in today’s corporate environment. Part 
II explains why the limitations arising from the fiduciary principle of 
undivided loyalty may compromise the effective use of constituency 
directors, potentially reducing a corporation’s access to NCE capital. 
Methodologically, Part II relies on insights from game theory and a 
stylized example to illustrate the social welfare implications of the 
undivided loyalty principle. Lastly, Part III puts forward this Article’s 
normative proposal and discusses related issues of implementation.  
I. CORPORATE CONTRACTING AND CONSTITUENCY DIRECTORS 
The canonical view of corporate governance relies on the fundamental 
assumption that all investors other than common shareholders are only 
concerned with some management actions and can thus fully protect their 
interests through contracting alone.
29  
 
 
 28. See Douglas G. Baird & M. Todd Henderson, Other People’s Money, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1309, 
1314 (2008) (arguing that “[i]n some instances the efficient ex ante bargain may include terms that 
look inefficient ex post”). Moreover, ex post renegotiation will generally be available to the 
contracting parties in order to redress ex post inefficiencies. See infra Part II.B.3. 
 29. See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, A Theory of Preferred Stock, 161 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1815, 1819 (2013) (observing that under standard accounts of corporate legal theory only 
the common shareholders are entitled to fiduciary benefits because their corporate contract “is almost 
entirely incomplete”; in contrast, no additional (i.e., non-contractually specified) rights are admitted in 
favor of other investors (e.g., lenders) because their contracts “approach completeness”.); Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 
50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1442–44 (1993) (arguing that shareholders are more vulnerable to the 
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This Part challenges that assumption. In some corporate environments, 
such as startups and declining corporations, NCE investors are not only 
interested in a limited set of management actions, but, like the common 
shareholders, are interested in all management actions. In these contexts, 
NCE investors face contracting problems virtually as serious as those 
facing shareholders. 
Such a reframing sheds much needed light on the appointment of 
constituency directors who are expected to represent the interests of NCE 
investors at the board level. As the ensuing discussion will show, in 
startups and declining corporations, NCE investors appoint constituency 
directors to secure protections that corporate contracting alone fails to 
provide.  
A. The Canonical View of Corporate Governance  
Corporate governance is the complex set of contractual and legal 
mechanisms that is designed to control the conflicts of interests that may 
arise among the several corporate constituencies. These conflicts are now 
well understood through agency theory, which has come to provide the 
standard analytical framework in corporate law and economics.
30
 The 
premise of agency theory is that self-interested agents may have incentives 
to exploit private information to opportunistically deviate from their 
principal’s best interest.31 Viewed through this lens, corporate conflicts fall 
into two main sets: vertical and horizontal agency problems.
32
  
 
 
risk of managerial misconduct and, at the same time, unable to bargain for effective protection against 
this risk); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. 
L. REV. 247, 314–15 (1999) (suggesting that unlike other corporate participants, shareholders face 
“unique vulnerabilities” that cannot be solved through explicit contracts).  
 30. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 29, at 248 (describing the principal-agent model as the 
primary analytical framework used in contemporary discussions of corporate governance); Robert H. 
Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 623 (2004) (“Agency cost 
theories of the firm dominate the modern literature of corporate law and economics.”). 
 31. The standard reference is to the work of Jensen and Meckling. See Jensen & Meckling, supra 
note 8, at 308–09. 
 32. See Robert P. Bartlett, III, Venture Capital, Agency Costs, and the False Dichotomy of the 
Corporation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 37, 42–45 (2006) (focusing on vertical and horizontal agency 
problems in the venture capital context); Simone M. Sepe, Corporate Agency Problems and Dequity 
Contracts, 36 J. CORP. L. 113, 116–17, 129–33 (2010) (discussing vertical and horizontal agency 
problems in publicly held corporations). Some scholars refer to vertical and horizontal agency 
problems as, respectively, “managerial” and “financial” agency problems. See George G. Triantis, A 
Free-Cash-Flow Theory of Secured Debt and Creditor Priorities, 80 VA. L. REV. 2155, 2158–59 
(1994). While the label may change, the substance of this distinction does not.  
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1. Vertical and Horizontal Agency Problems 
Vertical agency problems concern the central conflict of interest that 
arises in the modern corporation between the shareholders, as principals, 
and managers, as agents.
33
 Managers may pursue their own interest at the 
shareholders’ expense in a variety of ways. For example, they may shirk, 
pay themselves excessive compensation, undertake conflict of interest 
transactions, consume perquisites, engage in lavish empire building, 
pursue pet projects, or entrench themselves at the expense of 
shareholders.
34
 In all these situations, managers avoid taking actions that 
would increase firm value—a problem generally labeled by economists as 
engaging in “insufficient effort.”35 
Horizontal agency problems concern, instead, the conflicts that arise 
between the shareholders, as agents,
36
 and the other parties who provide 
capital to the corporation—be it in the form of debt, hybrid financial 
instruments such as preferred shares, or even labor
37—as principals. Here, 
shareholders have incentives to take actions, through their managers,
38
 that 
 
 
 33. See Bartlett, supra note 32, at 42, 51–56 (defining vertical agency problems as those “posed 
by the delegation of corporate authority to unrelated managers”); Sepe, supra note 32, at 116, 129–31 
(defining vertical agency problems as those arising out of the difficulty investors-principals encounter 
in inducing the managers-agents to behave). 
 34. For a detailed review of the many forms managerial opportunism can take, see Shleifer & 
Vishny, supra note 10, at 742–43.  
 35. In economics, the term “effort” is broadly used to refer to any action the agent takes to 
advance the principal’s interest. See JOHN ROBERTS, THE MODERN FIRM: ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN 
FOR PERFORMANCE AND GROWTH 126–27 (2004). Conversely, “insufficient effort” defines any action 
of the agent that does not advance the principal’s interest.  
 36. Agency theory conceives of the firm as a “legal fiction which serves as a focus for a complex 
process in which the conflicting objectives of individuals (some of whom may ‘represent’ other 
organizations) are brought into equilibrium within a framework of contractual relations.” Jensen & 
Meckling, supra note 8, at 311. This view of the firm as a “nexus of contracts” places all corporate 
participants on equal footing, conceiving of all of them as factors of production. See Jonathan R. 
Macey, Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims: Obligations to Nonshareholder Constituencies from a 
Theory of the Firm Perspective, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1266, 1266–67, 1269–73 (1999). In the legal 
rendering of this theory, however, shareholders retain a privileged corporate position as holders of 
ownership-like features. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of 
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 548, 564 (2003). This explains why other capital 
providers are concerned with the ability of shareholders, as firm-owners, “to enhance or destroy the 
value of her investment.” See Bartlett, supra note 32, at 44. 
 37. See supra note 5 (explaining why workers can be considered as providers of capital).  
 38. Since control over corporate affairs is exclusively vested in the managers in the public 
corporation, as a practical matter, managers, rather than shareholders, have the power to decide 
whether to pursue actions that are detrimental to the interests of NCE investors. See Sepe, supra note 
32, at 125. To overcome the impasse created by this discrepancy between practice and theory of 
corporate agency relationships, law and economics scholarship on horizontal agency problems has 
traditionally assumed away the central agency problem between shareholders and managers. See 
Triantis, supra note 32, at 2158 (explaining that financial (i.e., horizontal) agency problems arise under 
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enrich themselves at the expense of these other capital providers (i.e., NCE 
investors).
39
 While there are many ways managers may do this,
40
 the 
classic example is to take actions that increase corporate risk. Indeed, as 
residual claimants protected by limited liability, shareholders have a 
preference for high-risk, high-return investments.
41
 In contrast, NCE 
investors oppose risky actions that increase the likelihood that a 
corporation may fail to meet its fixed obligations
42—including interest and 
principal owed to debtholders, fixed dividends owed to preferred 
shareholders, and wages owed to employees.  
 
 
the assumption that “managers are perfect agents of their principals, the shareholders”); George G. 
Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate Governance, 83 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1073, 1077 (1995) (suggesting that the literature on shareholder-debtholder conflicts has 
developed by assuming away the shareholder-manager conflict). This is, however, a rather wanting 
approach, because in actuality horizontal and vertical agency problems tend to simultaneously affect 
corporate relationships. Moving from these observations, in my prior work I suggested that the 
theoretical framework of common agency might provide a better positive and normative account of 
corporate agency problems than the traditional principal-agent paradigm. See Sepe, supra note 32, at 
124–33. In economics, common agency is said to arise when several independent principals with 
divergent interests hire a single agent to perform multiple tasks. See B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael 
D. Whinston, Common Agency, 54 ECONOMETRICA 923 (1986) (pioneering the study of common 
agency). Consistent with this paradigm, in the modern corporation managers act as both agents of 
shareholders and NCE investors. On the one hand, they exercise delegated authority over the 
enterprise on behalf of the shareholders. On the other hand, in this position, they execute the contract 
of NCE investors with the firm (i.e., the shareholders as firm-owners). 
 39. See Bartlett, supra note 32, at 42, 61–64 (defining horizontal agency problems as those 
arising out of interinvestor conflicts); Sepe, supra note 32, at 116 (explaining that horizontal agency 
problems arise because different types of investors have “divergent preferences over desirable 
managerial actions”). 
 40. For example, managers may benefit shareholders at the debtholders’ expenses by paying out 
excessively large dividends, issuing additional debt, or substituting safe projects with riskier ones (i.e., 
engaging in what economists call “asset substitution” or “overinvestment”). See Clifford W. Smith, Jr. 
& Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117, 
118–19 (1979). Preferred shareholders may be exposed to similar risks, since their payoff structure 
often resembles that of debt more than that of common stock. See supra note 12. Likewise, managers 
may enrich shareholders by exploiting employees, for example by paying them low wages, forcing 
them to work long hours, and so forth. See John Armour et al., Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, 
in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 35, 36 
(Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2d ed. 2009).  
 41. As residual claimants, shareholders expect to reap all the upside from these strategies, while 
limited liability protects them from downside risks. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 8, at 334–37 
(offering the standard economic reference on the conflict arising from the divergent risk preferences of 
residual claimants and fixed claimants).  
 42. In this light, paying out excessive dividends or undertaking risky projects are both actions 
that increase corporate risk. Excessive dividend payment makes a corporation’s fixed claims riskier 
“indirectly,” “without per se increasing the riskiness of the firm’s income flow.” See TIROLE, supra 
note 16, at 85. Undertaking risky projects makes a corporation’s fixed claims riskier “directly,” by 
causing the firm’s income to become riskier. See id. 
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2. Contractual Incompleteness and Investor Remedies 
Incomplete contract theory
43
 helps to explain the issues confronting 
shareholders and NCE investors in their respective attempts to mitigate 
vertical and horizontal agency problems.
44
 At their core, both of these 
problems are in fact manifestations of the inherently incomplete nature of 
long-term contracts. If parties could contract for every possible 
contingency, then there would be no room for corporate opportunism of 
any form. Nevertheless, conventional wisdom states that the degree of 
contractual incompleteness faced by shareholders, as residual claimants, is 
more severe than that faced by NCE investors, as fixed claimants.
45
  
In financial terms, equating shareholders to residual claimants means 
that shareholder value is perfectly and positively correlated with asset 
value. Hence, in order to fully protect their investment expectations, 
shareholders should theoretically specify in advance the consequences to 
management of any given action, as all management actions affect asset 
value, to a greater or lesser extent. But, of course, such a contract is 
unattainable as the management decision-making process is infinite and 
continuous, with every tiny action having potentially some, even minor, 
impact on asset value. Incentive-compatible contracts that condition 
 
 
 43. Although a general definition of incomplete contract theory is absent in the literature, this 
theory relates to the central notion that transaction costs reduce a relationship’s feasible outcomes by 
imposing restrictions on the set of allowable contracts. See Jean Tirole, Incomplete Contracts: Where 
Do We Stand? 67 ECONOMETRICA 741, 743 (1999). To this extent, modern incomplete contract theory 
builds on the concept of transaction costs first introduced by Ronald Coase and later developed by 
Oliver Williamson. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); OLIVER E. 
WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985). Under this concept, the costs of 
bounded rationality (i.e., foreseeing contingencies), specification (i.e., writing contingencies) and 
verifiability (i.e., enforcing contractually specified contingencies) make it impossible for parties to 
write fully state-contingent agreements, engendering both ex ante and ex post inefficiency. See OLIVER 
HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 23–24 (1995).  
 44. It is worth observing that the law and economics literature on the theory of the firm has 
developed by combining elements of agency theory and incomplete contract theory. See Blair & Stout, 
supra note 29, at 261–63 (describing this combined model as “the grand-design principal-agent 
model”). Economically, however, these are two distinct theories. See HART, supra note 43, at 21–23. 
Under agency theory, contracting costs only arise from the difficulty of observing the agent’s actions 
and other relevant contingencies. See id. at 21. Incomplete contract theory, instead, is premised on the 
assumption that even observable contingencies might be not “verifiable,” i.e., effectively 
communicated to third parties with outside authority, such as courts. See id. at 23. 
 45. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making 
Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 25 
(1991) (arguing that the contracting problems facing “[o]ther constituencies . . . can be solved at far 
less cost than those confronting shareholders”); Bratton & Wachter, supra note 29, at 1839 
(contrasting the corporate interests of shareholders, which are “so broad as to be non-contractible”, 
with those of preferred shareholders, which can instead be bargained for and therefore protected by 
contract). 
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management compensation on firm performance (i.e., equity-based 
compensation schemes) can mitigate the costs associated with incomplete 
contracting, but never fully solve the problem.
46
 Therefore, shareholders 
need other forms of protection to fill the gap that contracting cannot. 
NCE investors, on the other hand, are not concerned with the daily 
fluctuations in asset value, but rather are concerned with the repayment of 
fixed claims. This theoretically reduces the set of management actions that 
are of interest to NCE investors to a set small enough to be contracted for 
in advance.
47
 Consequently, such investors can protect their claims 
through a combination of specific contractual provisions and price-based 
compensatory mechanisms (e.g., increased interest rates).
48
 Moreover, 
while the shareholders’ investment is locked in for the life of the 
corporation, the corporate relationship with NCE investors is subject to 
periodic renewals.
49
 This implies that, unlike shareholders, NCE investors 
have the ability to renegotiate original contractual terms to meet changes 
in the external state of the world.
50
  
 
 
 46. See MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT & JEAN TIROLE, THE PRUDENTIAL REGULATION OF BANKS 120 
(1994) (suggesting that the difficulty of verifying manager performance limits the effectiveness of 
incentive-based compensation in providing adequate discipline); Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, 
A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securities and Manager-Shareholder Congruence, 109 Q. J. 
ECON. 1027 (1994) (providing a formal analysis of the same argument). 
 47. See Jean Tirole, Corporate Governance, 69 ECONOMETRICA 1, 31 (2001) (explaining that 
non-controlling stakeholders (i.e., NCE providers) can contractually “circumscribe the action set 
available to the controlling stakeholder by ruling out those actions that are more likely to involve 
strong negative externalities on other stakeholders”); Macey, supra note 45, at 36 (“Nonshareholder 
constituencies can protect themselves against virtually any kind of managerial opportunism by 
retaining negative control over the firm’s operations.”).  
 48. For example, anti-dilution clauses provide, in general, a valuable tool against management 
actions that may dilute the value of debt or preferred shares. See Michael R. Roberts & Amir Sufi, 
Control Rights and Capital Structure: An Empirical Investigation, 64 J. FIN. 1657, 1663 (2009) 
(finding that 90% of debt includes provisions limiting a borrower’s total debt). Similarly, the posting 
of collateral, when available, significantly reduces the scope of asset substitution strategies. See 
Michael Bradley & Michael R. Roberts, The Structure and Pricing of Corporate Debt Covenants 17 
(May 13, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=466240 (finding that 
loans to firms with higher cash flow volatility (i.e., increased asset substitution risk) are more likely to 
include dividend restrictions and to require collateral). Along the same line, employees can and do 
bargain for contractual protection against the risk of shareholders’ expropriation, often just adhering to 
the collective labor contracts agreed upon between unions and corporations. Moreover, NCE investors 
can always demand increased prices as compensation for these and others forms of horizontal agency 
problems. See Bainbridge, supra note 29, at 1443 (arguing that nonshareholder constituencies “can 
protect themselves by adjusting the contract price to account for negative externalities imposed upon 
them by the firm”); Sepe, supra note 32, at 133–34 (explaining that managerial opportunism is a 
specific investment risk which increases firms’ cost of capital).  
 49. See Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 10, at 751–52; see also Williamson, Corporate 
Governance, supra note 10, at 1210.  
 50. See BERNARD SALANIÉ, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACTS: A PRIMER 194 (2d ed. 2005) 
(“[R]enegotiation allows the parties to react to unforeseen contingencies.”); Klaus M. Schmidt, 
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This analytical framework explains the different legal protection 
afforded to shareholders and NCE investors. Because of the contracting 
problems affecting shareholders, corporate law grants them the safeguard 
of “internal governance mechanisms”:51 general-purpose control 
instruments operating within the firm and designed to protect shareholder 
investments. The most important among these mechanisms are the right to 
elect the board of directors
52
 and the fiduciary duties owed by directors to 
shareholders.
53
 The board of directors is the organizational body charged 
with protecting the investment expectations of shareholders
54—acting as
 
 
Contract Renegotiation and Option Contracts, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 
AND THE LAW 432 (1998) (“Renegotiation is beneficial and necessary to achieve an ex post efficient 
outcome in every state of the world.”). The frequent renegotiation of private debt contracts is 
consistent with these theoretical assumptions. See Michael R. Roberts & Amir Sufi, Renegotiation of 
Financial Contracts: Evidence from Private Credit Agreements, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 159, 160 (2009) 
(reporting that more than 90% of private debt with stated maturity exceeding one year are 
renegotiated). 
 51. See, e.g., Simone M. Sepe, Regulating Risk and Governance in Banks: A Contractarian 
Perspective, 62 EMORY L.J. 327, 331, 354 (2012) (defining internal governance). 
 52. The shareholders’ power to elect the board includes the symmetric power to remove directors 
if shareholders are displeased with their activity. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 
946, 959 (Del. 1985) (“[T]he powers of corporate democracy are at [the shareholders’] disposal to turn 
the board out.”). Removal, however, must generally be for cause. See Campbell v. Loew’s, Inc., 134 
A.2d 852, 858 (Del. Ch. 1957).  
 53. Shareholders enjoy other internal governance mechanisms, such as the right to vote on major 
corporate transactions,
 
including charter amendments, mergers, sale of assets, and corporate 
dissolution. See Edward Rock et al., Significant Corporate Actions, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE 
LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 131, 132 (Reinier R. Kraakman et al. eds., 1st ed. 
2004) (“[A]ll corporate actions that are large, investment-like, and potentially self-interested are 
candidates for shareholder approval. . . .”). Further, under some statutes, shareholders can directly 
intervene in the governance of the corporation through the amendment of corporate bylaws. See, e.g., 
CAL. CORP. CODE § 211 (West 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (West 2011); N.Y. BUS. CORP. 
LAW § 601(a) (McKinney 2003). Lastly, shareholder-initiated proposals are possible under Rule 14a–8 
of the federal proxy rules (i.e., the “town meeting rule”), which gives shareholders voice in several 
governance subjects, including executive compensation, board organizational rules, and anti-takeover 
measures. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2011).  
 54. See Mark J. Roe, The Institutions of Corporate Governance, in HANDBOOK OF NEW 
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 371, 379 (Claude Ménard & Mary M. Shirley eds., 2005) (“The board is 
the quintessential vertical corporate governance institution.”); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the 
Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675 (2007) (describing the view that the board is charged with 
addressing the vertical agency problem between shareholders and managers); Benjamin E. Hermalin & 
Michael S. Weisbach, Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of 
the Economic Literature, 9 ECON. POL’Y REV., Apr. 2003, at 7, 9 (viewing the board as “an 
endogenously determined institution that helps to ameliorate the agency problems that plague any 
large organization”); Williamson, Corporate Governance, supra note 10, at 1210 (describing the board 
of directors as a governance structure whose principal purpose is to safeguard the interests of the 
shareholders). 
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the vigilant internal monitor of management on the one hand and being 
empowered to exercise discretionary power on the other.
55
 Fiduciary 
duties set guidelines for a board’s exercise of such power in disciplining 
management and, more generally, filling in the gaps of the shareholder 
contract.
56
 On the contrary, the rights of NCE investors are limited to those 
explicitly contracted for, on the assumption that these investors, unlike 
shareholders, can be fully protected by specific contractual provisions.
57
  
By drawing such a line between the remedies available to shareholders 
and NCE investors to protect their respective corporate interests, the law 
assigns the former a privileged corporate position as property right 
holders.
58
 The exclusive entitlement to internal governance mechanisms is 
the instrument through which the law grants shareholders residual control 
over the firm—defined here as the right to make adaptive decisions in 
response to unforeseen contingencies. Because of the theoretically less 
 
 
 55. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate 
Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV., Jan. 2002, at 1, 8 (2002); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, 
Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 313 (1983) (describing the board as the 
apex of the corporation’s “decision control system” exercising both monitoring powers and ultimate 
decision-making authority). Delegating the monitoring of managers to the board originates its own set 
of agency problems. See infra text accompanying notes 231–32 (discussing possible solutions to such 
problems). Nevertheless, an enduring understanding is that corporate decision-making improves when 
people who make decisions are separated from those who ratify them. See Fama & Jensen, supra, at 
303–04, 307–08. 
 56. The work of Easterbrook and Fischel provides the standard law and economics reference. See 
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, at 1432–34 (first outlining this view of corporate fiduciary 
duties); EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 10, at 15–17, 92 (reproducing the same argument).  
 57. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1519 (S.D.N.Y. 
1989) (explaining that the rights of corporate debtholders are limited to those arising from the contract 
governing the debtor–creditor relationship); Prod. Res. Grp., L.L.C. v. NCT Grp., Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 
790 (Del. Ch. 2004) (stating that creditors do not need additional protection because they are already 
“protected by strong covenants, liens on assets, and other negotiated contractual protection”). Preferred 
shareholders (as well as other classes of non-common shareholders) are treated similarly by the courts. 
See infra text accompanying note 158. Likewise, courts exclude employees from protection extending 
beyond their bargained-for rights. See, e.g., Merola v. Exergen Corp., 668 N.E.2d 351, 355 (Mass. 
1996).  
 The second step of the argument against the extension of shareholder-like privileges to NCE 
investors is that such investors already benefit from other bodies of law that effectively protect their 
interests. See Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The Legitimating Schemas of Modern 
Policy and Corporate Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1, 52–58 (2004) (providing an excellent summary of the 
arguments scholars have offered to explain why non-shareholders do not need corporate protection). 
For example, employees benefit from extensive protection under “pension laws, health and safety 
laws, minimum-wage laws, injury and disability compensation arrangements, antidiscrimination laws, 
sexual harassment laws, tort laws, and so on.” Id. at 53. Similarly, fraudulent conveyance laws, the 
practice of “piercing the corporate veil,” and regulatory restrictions provide creditors with specific 
legal remedies to protect their interests. Id. at 54. Courts have also employed this additional argument 
to deny extension of non-contractual protection to fixed claimants. See, e.g., N. Am. Catholic Educ. 
Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 99 (Del. 2007).  
 58. See supra note 11.  
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severe contracting problems facing NCE investors, their protection is 
instead limited to the specific control rights they bargain for ex ante, with 
the exclusion of any adaptive decision-making power.  
B. The Limits of Corporate Contracting  
The canonical view of corporate governance thus draws a bright line 
between shareholders’ rights, which occupy the center stage of corporate 
law, and the rights of NCE investors, which are instead relegated to the 
realm of contract law.
59
 In modern corporations, however, there exist 
circumstances that escape this rigid categorization, challenging both its 
accuracy and economic underpinnings. In these circumstances, the 
long-held assumption that all investors other than common shareholders 
can fully protect their interests through contracting alone simply no longer 
holds true. 
1. Sensitivity to Management Actions 
Figure 1 below is useful to begin to illustrate the circumstances that in 
modern corporations may blur the alleged distinction between the 
contracting positions of shareholders and NCE investors.  
 
 
 59. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 29, at 1819 (suggesting that in the classic account of 
corporate legal theory, a “well-understood wall” separates the legal treatment of shareholders and 
lenders (i.e., fixed claimants), with the shareholders being “corporate” and the lenders being 
“contractual”). Bratton and Wachter argue that this account is ill suited to capture the position of 
preferred shareholders, “their participation being both corporate and contractual.” See id. at 1819. This 
Article extends that claim by showing that other fixed claimants may share the hybrid position of 
preferred shareholders depending on the underlying corporate context.  
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Fig. 1. Payoff sensitivity to management action 
Figure 1 shows the sensitivity of investor payoff to management 
actions in four different corporations—Alpha, Beta, Gamma, and Delta—
each having one category of outstanding fixed (i.e., NCE) claims.
60
 The 
x-axis represents asset value. The y-axis represents investor payoff. Note 
that $100 is the face value of the fixed claims in each corporation. The 
portion of the x-axis that is included between the face value of the fixed 
claims ($100) and each corporation’s asset value can be interpreted as that 
corporation’s net worth. The Fixed Payoff line and Equity Payoff line, 
respectively, show fixed and equity payoff at each possible asset value 
level.  
The dashed horizontal lines with double-ended arrows represent 
corporate risk, expressed in the figure as the range of positive or negative 
variations in asset value that may follow riskier (Type I) or safer (Type II) 
management actions.
61
 For example, in the case of Corporation Alpha, 
 
 
 60. For the purpose of the ensuing discussion, these outstanding fixed claims can be equally 
interpreted as debt, preferred stock, or employee wages. 
 61. This representation of corporate risk reflects the general finance theory view of risk as “the 
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corporate risk is such that asset value can vary up to $35 upward or 
downward if management takes a riskier Type I Action, or $20 upward or 
downward if management takes a safer Type II Action.
62
 The volatility of 
corporate assets
63
 is what determines the magnitude of corporate risk 
across the four corporations,
64
 implying that some assets (and, therefore, 
industries) are more likely to be subject to value fluctuations than others. 
Lastly, the distribution of possible realizations at each given level of 
corporate risk is determined by management effort.
65
 High effort is more 
likely to result in positive realizations (moving to the right on the x-axis) 
and, conversely, low effort is more likely to result in negative realizations 
(moving to the left on the x-axis).
66
  
Consider first the case of Corporation Alpha, which has an asset value 
of $200. Here, the general assumption about the limited sensitivity of NCE 
investors to management actions remains intact. This is because, with an 
asset value of $200 and a corporate risk of either $35 or $20, no 
management action can jeopardize the repayment of fixed claims, even 
when management exerts low effort. This can be seen by plotting the 
intersections between Corporation Alpha’s corporate risk lines (i.e., “Type 
I Actions” and “Type II Actions” lines) and the fixed payoff line on the 
vertical axis. As shown by the figure, NCE investors are fully insulated 
from the effects of management action.  
Consider now, however, Corporation Beta, which has an asset value of 
$110. Since the corporate net worth is only $10 in this case, one can think 
of Corporation Beta as a “declining corporation”—a corporation that could 
 
 
extent of uncertainty associated with an asset’s returns.” See RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. 
BLACK, (SOME OF) THE ESSENTIALS OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT 85 (1993). 
 62. For simplicity’s sake, in this discussion, we can just say that in Corporation Alpha, corporate 
risk is $35 under Type I Actions and $20 under Type II Actions. The same simplified terminology will 
be adopted to describe corporate risk in Corporations Beta, Gamma, and Delta. 
 63. In this Article, the term “asset volatility” refers to the volatility of corporate assets that is 
independent from other endogenous corporate decisions, such as, for example, capital structure 
choices. See Hayne E. Leland & Klaus Bjerre Toft, Optimal Capital Structure, Endogenous 
Bankruptcy, and the Term Structure of Credit Spreads, 51 J. FIN. 987, 987–88 (1996). 
 64. This difference in the magnitude of corporate risk is expressed in the figure by the different 
lengths of the double-arrowed lines across the four corporations. For example, the range of asset value 
variations that may follow riskier management actions is $70 in Corporation Alpha, while it is $145 in 
Corporation Delta. 
 65. See Bengt Holmström, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. ECON. 74, 75–76 (1979) 
(modeling the principal’s monetary payoff as a function of both the agent’s unobservable actions (i.e., 
effort) and a random state of nature, with the expected realization of the principal’s monetary payoff 
increasing in the agent’s effort level).  
 66. For example, in the case of Corporation Alpha’s Type I Actions, high effort will make a 
realization in the range [0, $35] more likely, while low effort will make a realization in the range 
[-$35, 0] more likely. 
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soon enter financial distress.
67
 Corporate risk is the same for Corporation 
Beta as it was for Corporation Alpha: $35 or $20, depending on whether 
management takes a riskier or safer action. This means that Corporation 
Alpha and Corporation Beta share the same asset volatility. Thus, 
Corporation Beta can be understood as either a firm operating in the same 
industry as Corporation Alpha, but with a lower net worth than Alpha, or 
as Corporation Alpha itself upon difficult financial times. In this scenario, 
the assumption that NCE investors are virtually insensitive to management 
actions no longer holds true. If we plot the intersection between 
Corporation Beta’s corporate risk lines and the fixed payoff line on the 
vertical axis, we can see that the fixed payoff will be lower than $100 for 
any Type I Action that makes a realization in the range [-$35, $0] more 
likely as well as any Type II Action that makes a realization in the range [-
$20, $0] more likely.  
Compare now Corporation Beta and Corporation Gamma, which have 
the same asset value: $110. For Corporation Gamma, however, the nature 
of the corporate assets is such that corporate risk is only $5, regardless of 
whether management takes riskier or safer actions.
68
 Given these corporate 
features, no management action can jeopardize the repayment of the fixed 
claims. Indeed, the fixed payoff remains $100 for any point of Corporation 
Gamma’s corporate risk line. 
Finally, consider Corporation Delta, which has an asset value of $55 
and, therefore, a negative net worth. While this makes Corporation Delta 
technically insolvent, it is worth observing that technical insolvency is 
quite common in the early stages of many startups.
69
 This is because 
startups often experience years of operating losses and negative cash flows 
before generating any significant revenue.
70
 As for Corporation Delta’s 
 
 
 67. See Aswath Damodaran, Valuing Distressed and Declining Companies 4–5 (June 2009) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1428022 
(defining a declining corporation as one with stagnant revenues, shrinking or negative operating 
margins, asset divestitures, big payouts, and overwhelming debt burdens). Relatedly, distressed firms 
in this Article are defined as declining firms that have difficulties meeting their financial obligations. 
 68. To this extent, Corporation Gamma can be interpreted as, for example, a company in the 
wholesale industry, which has relatively low volatility. See Zijun Wang, Dynamics and Causality in 
Industry-Specific Volatility, 34 J. BANKING & FIN. 1688, 1693 (2010) (providing empirical evidence 
that volatility values for the wholesale industry are lower than the average and market volatility 
values). 
 69. See J. CHRIS LEACH & RONALD W. MELICHER, ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE 533 (4th ed. 
2009).  
 70. See Darian M. Ibrahim, Debt as Venture Capital, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1169, 1175. Research 
and development expenses, marketing costs, and the hiring of employees absorb most of the available 
funds of early-stage startups. Id. For this reason, “[s]tart-ups can burn through millions of dollars a 
month before having any sort of revenue-generating product or service to market.” Id. at 1175. 
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corporate risk, asset value can vary up to $50 downward and $90 upward 
under Type I Actions,
71
 while it can vary up to $20 downward or upward 
under Type II Actions. In this corporate context, any management action 
will have an impact on the NCE investors’ payoff. As shown by the figure, 
with negative corporate net worth, for every one dollar increase in asset 
value, the fixed payoff value correspondingly rises by one dollar.  
Thus, in contrast to conventional accounts of corporate governance, 
these examples indicate that, for NCE investors, sensitivity to management 
actions (i.e., both risk and effort choices) is a dynamic feature that varies 
with firm-specific determinants in a continuum that goes from low to high 
sensitivity. In particular, as shown by Figure 1, two factors that influence 
the degree to which NCE investors are affected by management 
decision-making are (a) a corporation’s net worth and (b) asset volatility. 
A corporation’s net worth determines the financial cushion that is 
available to absorb losses from investments.
72
 The lower the corporate net 
worth, the more likely it is that management actions may jeopardize the 
repayment of fixed claims.
73
 Asset volatility determines the relative impact 
of management actions on asset value. This impact will tend to be greater 
when assets are more volatile because this feature increases the possible 
variations in asset value that may result from any given management 
action.  
2. Startups and Declining Corporations 
The above analytical framework suggests that there are at least two 
well-identified corporate contexts in which NCE investors are highly 
sensitive to management decision-making: startups and declining 
corporations.
74
 Both contexts are characterized by low net worth and high 
 
 
 71. Because of limited liability, a zero valuation is the worst-case scenario. This explains why 
the range of asset value variations under riskier management actions is asymmetric in this case.  
 72. It is worth observing that when a corporation has multiple outstanding fixed claims at one 
time, for each category (or class) of fixed claimants, the net-worth-to-fixed-claims ratio provides the 
actual measure of that corporation’s available financial cushion. That is, for each category of fixed 
claimants, a corporation’s financial cushion will be provided by the corporation’s net assets and 
subordinated fixed claims that are available to absorb losses ahead of the category of fixed claims at 
hand. As an example, imagine a corporation with three categories of fixed claims: labor, debt, and 
preferred shares. Using   for labor,   for debt,   for preferred shares, and   for equity, the following 
is the order of priority of payment:  ,  ,  ,  . The net-worth-to-fixed-claims ratio for each category of 
fixed claims will be as follows: (i) for  : 
     
 
; (ii) for  : 
     
 
; and (iii) for  : 
 
 
. 
 73. See TIROLE, supra note 16, at 105–06 (“The borrower’s basic financial strength and ability to 
support debt and absorb downturns lie in its net worth.”).  
 74. A fortiori, NCE investors are highly sensitive to management actions in distressed 
corporations. See supra note 67.  
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asset volatility, and thus NCE investments are likely to be more affected 
by any management action as stated above. In startups, low net worth is 
generally attributable to asset value being dependent on 
difficult-to-evaluate intangible assets, such as technological know-how, 
patents, trade secrets, and human capital.
75
 In declining corporations, it is 
instead the result of declines in asset value caused by exogenous shocks 
(e.g., a decrease in demand for corporate products), endogenous factors 
(e.g., mismanagement), or, most frequently, a combination of the two. 
Low net worth combines in both cases with high asset volatility, since 
intangible assets, in the case of startups, and distressed assets, in the case 
of declining corporations, are more subject to value fluctuations than are 
other assets.
76
  
Startups and declining corporations are further characterized by 
investments with a high degree of information asymmetry, where much of 
the most valuable information is available only to management. Indeed, in 
a corporation with low net worth and high asset volatility, investors are 
motivated to invest by a company’s “hidden corporate value.” As 
explained by Bernard Black and Reinier Kraakman, corporate value is 
“hidden” when “a firm’s true economic value is visible to well-informed 
corporate directors [and managers],”77 while the firm’s investors are left 
with only an imperfect inference of that value. It is self-evident that 
startups fit into this corporate model. Startups are intrinsically 
characterized by a high degree of information asymmetry between 
management and investors, which tends to remain for a significant period 
 
 
 75. See Ibrahim, supra note 70, at 1175.  
 76. In the case of intangible assets, the assumption is that volatility is higher because multiple 
idiosyncratic factors combine to determine asset value. Consistent with this theoretical assumption, 
Hewlett-Packard, for example, had a twenty-four percent stock price decline that corresponded to a 
nearly sixty percent drop in the value of its intellectual property and intangible assets in 2008–2009. 
See GORDON V. SMITH & RUSSELL L. PARR, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: VALUATION, EXPLOITATION, 
AND INFRINGEMENT DAMAGES 97 (4th ed. 2011). In declining corporations, instead, higher volatility is 
likely to arise because of the shareholders’ preferences for riskier projects. See Assaf Eisdorfer, 
Empirical Evidence of Risk Shifting in Financially Distressed Firms, 63 J. FIN. 609, 610 (2008) (“As 
high risk benefits the shareholders of distressed firms, an increase in the volatility of a project may 
provide an opportunity for shareholders to increase value by investing in a risky project.”).  
 77. Black & Kraakman, supra note 15, at 521–22. The hidden value model of the corporation 
rests on the assumptions that company-specific private information is (i) severe, either because most 
information is soft or corporate value would be diminished by premature disclosure; (ii) significant, in 
that the divergence between actual corporate value and market value is potentially large; and 
(iii) long-lasting, as actual corporate value can remain hidden for a long time before becoming 
“visible” to outsiders. See id. at 529–30; see also infra note 92 (defining “soft information”). While 
Black and Kraakman remain skeptical about the general applicability of this model, they concede that 
“[t]here may be exceptional cases, perhaps involving new, hard-to-value technology, where a larger 
amount of hidden value could be plausible.” Id. at 553. 
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of time.
78
 In fact, the whole business model of these firms depends on 
management’s unique ability to generate returns from highly specialized 
resources. Similar issues affect declining corporations because their 
recovery potential (i.e., going-concern value) is largely dependent on 
management’s ability to exploit opportunities that are not visible, and 
often unavailable, to outsiders.
79
  
Lastly, investment specificity emerges as an additional feature that is 
shared by these corporate contexts. Specificity characterizes investments 
(or, more generally, assets) that, once deployed for a specific purpose, can 
be redeployed to alternative uses or users only at a loss of value.
80
 Put 
another way, specific investments have limited exit.
81
 Two features add to 
the specificity of financial and human capital investments in startups and 
declining corporations. First, the cost of acquiring information is high and 
difficult to recover because of the severe degree of information asymmetry 
affecting these corporate contexts.
82
 Second, information is only valuable 
with respect to the specific corporation for which it was acquired, which 
implies that investors can only realize the upside of their investments as 
long as they maintain the relationship with that corporation.
83
   
 
 
 78. See, e.g., Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, The Economics of Small Business Finance: 
The Roles of Private Equity and Debt Markets in the Financial Growth Cycle, 22 J. BANKING & FIN. 
613, 614, 616 (1998) (discussing “informational opacity” in startups); Jeffrey J. Trester, Venture 
Capital Contracting Under Asymmetric Information, 22 J. BANKING & FIN. 675 (1998) (suggesting 
that startups’ high level of asymmetric information can explain why preferred shares, rather than 
common equity, is the most frequent form of financing in venture capital investments). 
 79. The issue with declining corporations is understanding whether decline is reversible, which is 
likely dependent upon information that is available only to the management. For example, in 1982, 
after Harley-Davidson reported a loss of $30 million, many analysts pointed to the irreversibility of the 
company’s decline. A new management team, however, was able to reverse this trend, devising “a 
strategy built around an [sic] loyal customer base and an iconic brand,” causing Harley to rebound to 
profitability. See Damodaran, supra note 67, at 27.  
 80. The standard reference is to the studies of Oliver Williamson. See, e.g., WILLIAMSON, supra 
note 43, at 55. 
 81. See supra note 17.  
 82. See Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual 
Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 240 (1979) (observing that set-up costs can be recouped only as long 
as the relationship in which they were incurred is maintained).  
 83. Id. It is also worth observing here that situations involving specialized investment capital are 
commonly “symmetrical.” This means that, for the counterparty of a specialized investor (in this case, 
startups and declining corporations), “the cost of supply from unspecialized capital is presumably 
great.” See id. 
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3. Non-Common Equity (NCE) Investors as Quasi-Residual Claimants 
Low net worth, asset volatility, severe asymmetric information, and 
investment specificity combine to turn NCE investors into “quasi-residual 
claimants,” who are sensitive to any management actions and thus exposed 
to severe contractual incompleteness issues, despite holding only fixed 
claims against the corporation.
84
 This is partially acknowledged by more 
recent corporate scholarship, which suggests that NCE investors employ 
complex agreements
85
 to address the more severe contracting problems 
they face in these contexts.
86
 Because of this particular sensitivity to 
management actions, and the attendant risks, investors in startups and 
declining corporations generally tend to be more informed and 
sophisticated parties, such as venture capitalists, banks, private equity 
funds, or hedge funds.
87
 Unlike less-sophisticated investors, these parties 
have both the economic resources and expertise to bargain for the right
 
 
 84. Option theory is useful to better illustrate the concept of quasi-residual claimants. Viewed 
through this prism, equity is understood as a call option over corporate assets, whose strike price is 
represented by the face value of the firm’s claims that are senior to equity (i.e., NCE claims). See 
Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 
637 (1973). The common shareholders are thus residual claimants in the sense that they are entitled to 
claim the difference between asset value and face value of the NCE claims at the option’s maturity 
date. On such date, if the firm’s assets are worth more than the NCE claims (the option is “in the 
money”), the shareholders will exercise their option; otherwise (if the option is “out of the money”), 
they will let the option expire. See GILSON & BLACK, supra note 61, at 233. This implies that the NCE 
investors are entitled to all the cash flows generated by the assets until their claims are repaid in full. In 
this sense, as long as the face value of NCE claims is below asset value, the NCE investors are quasi-
residual claimants. This paradigm perfectly describes investors in startups and declining corporations 
where the shareholders’ call option is generally out of the money.  
 85.  See Karen Eggleston et al., The Design and Interpretation of Contracts: Why Complexity 
Matters, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 91, 91 (2000) (stating that complex agreements have “many terms 
describing the obligations of parties across alternative future states of the world; these terms . . . 
provide for highly variable rewards for desired behavior and penalties for undesired behavior; and 
these rewards and penalties . . . bear a complex mathematical relationship to the value of the benefits 
produced by the different kinds of behavior”). 
 86. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Essay, Private Debt and the Missing 
Lever of Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209 (2006) (discussing creditor contracts in 
declining corporations); Stuart C. Gilson & Michael R. Vetsuypens, Creditor Control in Financially 
Distressed Firms: Empirical Evidence, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1005, 1007–11 (1994) (empirically 
documenting an increase in the number of restrictive covenants and veto provisions in contracts of 
creditors of distressed corporations); Steven N. Kaplan et al., How Do Legal Differences and 
Experience Affect Financial Contracts?, 16 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 273, 306 (2007) (suggesting that 
sophistication variables in venture capital contracts consistently have significant explanatory power).  
 87. See, e.g., Baird & Henderson, supra note 28, at 1328 (observing that venture capital contracts 
are “heavily negotiated by informed and sophisticated parties”); M. Todd Henderson, Paying CEOs in 
Bankruptcy: Executive Compensation When Agency Costs Are Low, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1543, 1563 
(2007) (“[S]ophisticated investors, such as banks, insurance companies, hedge funds, and bondholders 
. . . are specialist, repeat players in workouts or distressed investing.”). 
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incentive schemes
88
 and to supplement such schemes with extremely 
complex allocations of specific control rights.
89
  
However, this view assumes that the issue is simply that NCE investors 
in startups and declining corporations are concerned with a larger set of 
possible management actions, such that complex contracting may 
effectively protect the investors’ rights. Yet even complex contracting may 
be inadequate in such corporate contexts. For one thing, the contract might 
fail to serve as an effective monitoring mechanism because “external 
monitoring”—monitoring as provided for by contractual provisions, such 
as informational covenants that set regular reporting requirements
90—can 
at best result in the ex post acquisition of information concerning 
management actions.
91
 Such mechanisms are inferior to “internal 
monitoring” mechanisms—those exercised within the corporate 
organization—which lead to the acquisition of information on 
management actions as they occur. Moreover, external monitoring cannot 
provide access to soft information,
92
 which is unverifiable to outsiders and, 
therefore, cannot be captured by specific contractual provisions. To some 
extent these limits arise in any corporate environment, but they are 
exacerbated where information asymmetry between management and 
outsiders is significant and potentially long-lasting.  
 
 
 88. For example, the empirical evidence shows that both venture capitalists and other specialist 
providers of NCE capital often play a significant role in setting management compensation policies in 
startups and declining corporations respectively. See Michael Klausner & Kate Litvak, What 
Economists Have Taught Us About Venture Capital Contracting, in BRIDGING THE ENTREPRENEURIAL 
FINANCING GAP: LINKING GOVERNANCE WITH REGULATORY POLICY 60–62 (Michael J. Whincop ed., 
2001); Henderson, supra note 87, at 1617; Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate 
Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 
669, 711 (1993).  
 89. See Baird & Henderson, supra note 28, at 1328–29. As Baird and Henderson aptly observed, 
a firm’s “formation”—the startup stage—and “death”—financial distress—raise similar crucial issues, 
which make the allocation of control rights pivotal. Id. at 1329 & n.91. This part analyzes why this is 
the case and why such situations may demand that property rights conferring residual rights of control 
be shifted from shareholders to NCE investors.  
 90. See TIROLE, supra note 16, at 86 (describing informational covenants). 
 91. See Henderson, supra note 87, at 1559 (“The only information available to most investors is 
the highly ritualized and often opaque information that comes through official, regulated disclosures 
and public statements, which do not provide sufficient information to monitor key aspects of firm 
behavior.”). Henderson argues that monitoring costs decrease once a corporation enters a formal 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy procedure “because of the powers [NCE investors] wield by statute, regulation, 
and contract, as well as through the more robust judicial oversight by the bankruptcy court.” Id. at 
1563. In private workouts, however, NCE investors lack both these powers and the benefit of judicial 
oversight. 
 92. “Hard information” is “information that can be verified by the investors once disclosed by 
the issuer” (i.e., the corporation). See TIROLE, supra note 16, at 249. In contrast, “soft information” is 
information that cannot be easily verified by the investors even when it is disclosed. Id. at 250. 
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Additionally, the contract might be an inadequate instrument to ensure 
effective enforcement of even the bargained-for rights of NCE investors in 
startups and declining corporations. First, courts are less likely to be able 
to verify information where corporate value is hidden. Consider, for 
example, a contractual provision granting investors the right to sell the 
corporation at a “fair price” upon some set of triggering events. The court 
may find it extremely difficult to discern whether a given price is “fair” 
when market value cannot provide a viable benchmark.
93
 Second, 
self-enforcing contractual provisions that can operate without court 
intervention may become ineffectual where investments are highly 
specific. As noted above, specificity limits the availability of exit (e.g., 
withdrawal rights).
94
 Consequently, it also limits an investor’s ability to 
employ the threat of exit, which is one of the most common means of 
making contractual provisions self-enforcing.
95
 Imagine a contract 
providing for a right of withdrawal upon the management’s violation of a 
no-change-of-business-line covenant.
96
 Because the threat of exit may ring 
hollow when investments are specific, the related covenant becomes 
toothless.  
This parallels the contracting problems faced by shareholders. On the 
one hand, the defining features of NCE investments in startups and 
declining corporations virtually require that NCE investors, similar to 
shareholders,
97
 control any management action in order to realize the 
upside of their claims (i.e., extract hidden corporate value). On the other 
hand, these same features make the contract alone an inadequate 
instrument to provide them with this kind of control.
98 
 
As noted in Part I.A.2, corporate law’s response to shareholder 
contracting problems is to provide the added safeguards of internal 
governance mechanisms—the shareholder franchise and fiduciary 
 
 
 93. See supra note 77 (describing the distinguishing features of the hidden value model of the 
corporation). 
 94. See supra text accompanying notes 80–83 (discussing asset specifity). 
 95. See, e.g., TIROLE, supra note 16, at 31–32 (arguing that exit rights are a means to make the 
claims of noncontrolling stakeholders (i.e., NCE investors) insensitive to the actions of shareholders 
(i.e., management)); Sepe, supra note 51, at 365–66 (describing the self-enforcing function of the 
threat of exit in creditors’ contracts). 
 96. Covenants earmarking the loan for specific purposes or preventing investments in new lines 
of business are designed to constrain the risk of ex post increases in corporate risk. See TIROLE, supra 
note 16, at 85.  
 97. See Macey, supra note 45, at 36 (“[S]hareholders must retain positive control over the 
actions of the firm in order to realize the full potential value of their shares.”).  
 98. See supra text accompanying notes 45–46 (discussing the contractual incompleteness issues 
affecting shareholders). 
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protection.
99
 These mechanisms grant shareholders, as beneficiaries of 
board action, residual control over the corporation, consisting in the power 
to take adaptive action. In economic terms, we can say that the allocation 
of residual control to the shareholders serves to satisfy their “participation 
constraint,”100 making the shareholders’ corporate contract one worth 
undertaking.  
Because NCE investors in startups and declining corporations are 
confronted with analogous contracting problems, a rational argument 
exists for assuming that they would seek similarly added safeguards to 
make their investments viable.
101
 Thus one can predict that, lacking legal 
entitlement to such institutional protections, these investors would 
privately bargain for them. In practice, NCE investors in startups and 
declining corporations do just that. As the next Part will explain, NCE 
investors regularly appoint “constituency directors” who are expected to 
act as their representatives on the board and exercise residual control over 
the corporation on their behalves.  
C. The Rise of Constituency Directors  
A working definition of “constituency directors” (also known as 
“representative directors” or “designated directors”) includes directors 
whose election to the board is traceable to a well-identified corporate 
constituency (i.e., the “designating investor” or “sponsor”). As discussed 
below, examples include directors designated by venture capitalists, 
preferred shareholders, creditors, labor unions, and even the federal 
government.
102
  
 
 
 99. See supra text accompanying notes 51–56 (discussing internal governance mechanisms). 
 100. The participation constraint, or “individual rationality constraint,” is defined as a property of 
optimal agency contracts which is satisfied when the contract leaves all participants at least as well off 
as they would have been if they had not participated. See SALANIÉ, supra note 50, at 122. 
 101. See Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American 
Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1082 (2003) (arguing that when uncertainty is extreme, the 
contractual structure needs to compensate for this uncertainty “by means of a governance structure: 
creating a process that will determine the response to an unexpected event”); Williamson, Corporate 
Governance, supra note 10, at 1205–06 (suggesting that non-shareholders investing in specific assets 
may need board representation, in addition to specialized contractual structures, in order to protect 
their interests).  
 102. See supra note 4 (explaining why the discussion of constituency directors who are appointed 
by the common shareholders remains outside the scope of this Article). 
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1. Venture Capital Contracts 
Because of their intrinsic complexities, venture capital investments in 
startups are often described as an example of financing that obliterates the 
difference between debt and equity.
103
 In practice, however, during the 
earlier, and riskier, stages of a venture, venture capitalists almost always 
choose debt-like attributes by investing in preferred stock with substantial 
liquidation preferences.
104
 To protect their (debt-like) cash flow rights, 
venture capitalists routinely secure board representation in addition to 
enhanced control rights.
105
 In their study of startups, Steven Kaplan and 
Per Strömberg report that venture capitalist investors obtain a seat on the 
board of directors in over 40 percent of startups and board control in about 
25 percent.
106
 However, as observed by Jesse Fried and Mira Ganor, this 
likely underrepresents the frequency with which venture capitalists acquire 
board control.
107
 In many cases, seemingly independent startup directors 
“are chosen by the [venture capitalists] . . . and have—or can expect to 
have—long-term professional and business ties with the [venture 
capitalists].”108 This reflects the fact that a constituency director need not 
 
 
 103. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 86, at 1217. 
 104. See, e.g., METRICK & YASUDA, supra note 12, at 163; see also Richard A. Mann et al., 
Starting From Scratch: A Lawyer's Guide to Representing a Start-up Company, 56 ARK. L. REV. 773 
app. at 858–60 (2004) (observing that the liquidation rights of VC investors can be equal to six times 
the original investment or higher). Although the preferred stock agreements of venture capitalists 
regularly include conversion options, conversion is typically triggered by events occurring in later 
development stages, such as the achievement of performance targets or a successful initial public 
offering (IPO). See George G. Triantis, Financial Contract Design in the World of Venture Capital, 68 
U. CHI. L. REV. 305, 317 (2001) (reviewing PAUL GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL 
CYCLE (1999)). 
 105. See Gilson, supra note 101, at 1073–74, 1082–83.  
 106. See Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real 
World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 REV. ECON. STUD. 281, 287–90 
(2003) (investigating a sample of 119 startups). Further studies reveal that the extent of board control 
by venture capitalists increases with each round of funding. See Ibrahim, supra note 70, at 1193. 
Additionally, board control by venture capitalists does not necessarily decline after a portfolio 
company becomes publicly traded. See Moscow, supra note 4, at 14–15. Instead, in a significant 
number of venture-financed IPOs, VC investors continue to hold directorship until their investment in 
the firm is entirely liquidated. See Joseph Hinsey, The Constituency Director, THE HARVARD L. SCH. 
F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 14, 2008, 3:26 PM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ 
corpgov/2008/01/14/the-constituency-director. 
 107. See Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in Startups, 81 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 988–89 (2006). 
 108. Id. at 988–89. See also D. Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA L. 
Rev. 315, 320 (2005) (observing that “in the event of conflict between the venture capitalist and the 
entrepreneur . . . outside directors may have a natural inclination to side with the venture capitalist”); 
William W. Bratton, Venture Capital on the Downside: Preferred Stock and Corporate Control, 100 
MICH. L.REV. 891, 921 (2002) (arguing that outside directors are “highly susceptible to the influence 
of the VC”) (italics omitted).  
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be defined explicitly as such, but rather may be the result of a director’s 
affiliation, whether professional or personal, with the designating investor.  
2. Creditor, Union, and Government Contracts 
The appointment of constituency directors has the most variegated 
implications in the context of the declining corporation. In recent years, 
corporate law scholars have paid increasing attention to the active role of 
creditors in corporate governance, especially in troubled corporations.
109
 
While these scholars rarely explicitly label creditor-appointed board 
members as constituency directors, they observe that taking one or more 
board seats is one of the preferential ways through which creditors 
exercise substantial control over these corporations.
110
  
Constituency directors in declining corporations may also be 
nominated by unions. Despite the absence of a mandate for workforce 
codetermination of board members in the United States,
111
 the past thirty 
years have seen American unions obtain board seats in exchange for wage 
concessions and other union givebacks to financially troubled 
corporations.
112
 Recent research suggests that this trend continues,
113
 
especially in sectors where unions have had historic success at securing 
board seats, such as the automotive, trucking, airlines, and steel 
 
 
 109. See, e.g., Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 86 (focusing on private debt); Gilson & 
Vetsuypens, supra note 86; Henderson, supra note 87, at 1563–69 (discussing creditor governance in 
reorganizing firms in both Chapter 11 and private procedures).  
 110. See, e.g., Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 86, at 1217; Henderson, supra note 87, at 1581–82; 
Edith S. Hotchkiss & Robert M. Mooradian, Vulture Investors and the Market for Control of 
Distressed Firms, 43 J. FIN. ECON. 401, 409–11 (1997) (finding that vulture investors take board 
positions in about thirty percent of the cases and that, because of the lack of available data, this figure 
is likely to underestimate effective board involvement by such investors).  
 111. These mechanisms are instead common in some European countries, most notably Germany. 
See, e.g., Katharina Pistor, Codetermination: A Sociopolitical Model with Governance Externalities, in 
EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 163 (Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 1999).  
 112. See, e.g., Eileen Appelbaum & Larry W. Hunter, Union Participation in Strategic Decisions 
of Corporations, in EMERGING LABOR MARKET INSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 265, 
280–84 (Richard B. Freeman et al. eds., 2005); Larry W. Hunter, Can Strategic Participation Be 
Institutionalized? Union Representation on American Corporate Boards, 51 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 
557 (1998). The most well-known example is the appointment of Douglas Fraser, the then-president of 
United Auto Workers, to the board of Chrysler following the concessions associated with the 
company’s near collapse in 1980. See Douglas A. Fraser, Worker Participation in Corporate 
Government: The U.A.W.-Chrysler Experience, 58 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 949 (1982). It is worth 
emphasizing that, from the hidden value perspective adopted by this Article, unions’ wage concessions 
to declining corporations are qualitatively equivalent to the financial concessions of lenders 
specialized in distressed investments. Indeed, both these constituencies make a bet on a declining 
corporation’s hidden opportunities for economic recovery. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 113. See Appelbaum & Hunter, supra note 112, at 281. 
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industries.
114
 The appointment of a representative of the United Auto 
Workers union to the boards of directors of the “new” General Motors 
(“GM”)115 and Chrysler116 are only the most recent manifestations of this 
trend.
117
 
Yet the most innovative use of constituency directors in declining 
corporations has emerged in connection with the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (TARP)
118
 launched by the U.S. government during the financial 
 
 
 114. See Robert B. McKersie, Union Nominated Directors: A New Voice in Corporate 
Governance, in NEGOTIATIONS AND CHANGE: FROM THE WORKPLACE TO SOCIETY 223 (Thomas A. 
Kochan & David B. Lipsky eds., 2003). Consistent with the use of constituency directors by other 
types of NCE investors, union board representation does not necessarily require active union 
membership. Although union officials have held directorships, other common approaches involve the 
appointment of retired union officials and “union-friendly” outsiders, such as union consultants and 
lawyers. Appelbaum & Hunter, supra note 112, at 281–82.  
 115. See Press Release, United Automobile Workers, VEBA Trustees Name Stephen J. Girsky to 
Board of General Motors (June 18, 2009), available at http://www.uaw.org/articles/veba-trustees-
name-stephen-j-girsky-board-general-motors.  
 116. See Press Release, Chrysler Group, New Appointments to the Chrysler Group Board of 
Directors (June 14, 2012), available at http://www.chryslergroupllc.com/Investor/PressReleases/ 
ChryslerDocuments/ChryslerGroupLLC_NewAppointmentsBoD_2012June14.pdf. 
 117. The UAW obtained board representation in exchange for the concessions made during the 
2009 restructuring of both GM and Chrysler, which included eased demands on both wages and job 
security. Most importantly, the UAW agreed to waive the cash payments GM and Chrysler owed to it 
as trustee of each company’s VEBA fund. See Micheline Maynard, Union Takes Rare Front Seat in 
Chrysler Deal, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2009, at A1. A VEBA—Voluntary Employee Benefit 
Association—is a trust that holds funds to meet the cost of health and welfare benefits, with funds 
being provided by periodic employer contributions. See BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 490 (9th ed. 2007). In 2007, both GM and Chrysler reached an agreement 
with the UAW to transfer their employees’ health benefits plans to two newly founded VEBA trusts. 
With this transfer, the UAW assumed all responsibilities for health care inflation risk in exchange for 
periodic cash contributions by GM and Chrysler. See Ellen O’Brien, What Do the New Auto Industry 
VEBAs Mean for Current and Future Retirees?, AARP 1 (Mar. 2008), available at 
http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/econ/i4_veba.pdf. Thus, when in 2009 both GM and Chrysler went into 
Chapter 11, the UAW, backed by the U.S. government, received preferential treatment as each 
company’s largest creditor. See James Sherk & Todd Zywicki, Opinion, Sherk and Zywicki: Obama’s 
United Auto Workers Bailout, WALL ST. J. (June 13, 2012, 10:07 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052702303768104577462650268680454.html (arguing that the UAW’s preferential 
treatment violated the distribution priority rules of U.S. bankruptcy law). Among other benefits, the 
UAW received a consistent share of the stock of the “new” GM and Chrysler as a guarantee of the 
companies’ future fulfillment of VEBA obligations and the right to appoint a union representative to 
the board of each company. See Maynard, supra; David Welch, UAW Sends Girsky to GM’s Board, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 18, 2009), http://www.businessweek.com/autos/autobeat/archives/ 
2009/06/uaw_sends_girsk.html. 
 118. TARP was established within the legal framework of the Emergency Economic Stabilization 
Act, which Congress enacted in October 2008 in the effort to contain the systemic effects of the 
financial crisis. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 
3765 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). Under TARP, the U.S. Department of 
Treasury was authorized to purchase toxic assets (i.e., mortgages, mortgage-backed securities, and 
other structured products) for an amount of almost $700 billion through the establishment of multiple 
specific programs. See About TARP, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives 
/financial-stability/about-tarp/Pages/what-did-tarp-do.aspx (last updated Dec. 12, 2013, 10:51 AM). 
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crisis of 2007–2009 to rescue troubled financial institutions.119 Under the 
Capital Purchase Program (CPP), which was the first and largest of the 
multiple initiatives conducted within the TARP framework, the U.S. 
Department of Treasury purchased $205 billion in senior preferred stock 
(“Preferred”) from 707 troubled banks.120 While the Preferred were 
nonvoting, in a little-noticed part the Treasury’s term sheet provided that 
“[i]f dividends on the Preferred are not paid in full for six dividend 
periods, whether or not consecutive, the Preferred will have the right to 
elect 2 directors.”121 A similar provision appeared in the terms and 
conditions of the Systemically Significant Failing Institutions Program 
(SSFIP)—the initial program the Treasury used to provide liquidity 
support to insurance giant AIG.
122
 Even less-noticed was the fact that the 
Treasury did exercise its rights to elect board members under both the CPP 
and the SSFIP. In April 2010, after AIG had missed multiple TARP 
dividend payments, the Treasury exercised its right to appoint two 
directors to the AIG board.
123
 Similarly, in July 2011, the Treasury 
announced that it had, for the first time, elected directors to the boards of 
two recipients of CPP funds that had breached the six-missed-dividend 
waiver.
124
 By October 2012, the number of Treasury-appointed directors 
had increased to twenty-four across fourteen CPP institutions.
125
   
 
 
 119. Although less apparent on the surface, this Article’s hidden value theory of NCE investments 
also applies to the U.S. government’s interventions in troubled financial corporations. Indeed, by 
preserving the hidden opportunities for economic recovery of these corporations, the government 
prevents individual failures that may lead to macroeconomic shocks. Hence, the extraction of hidden 
corporate value in these circumstances takes an indirect form, consisting of the government’s 
avoidance of the enormous expenses associated to macroeconomic shocks.  
 120. See Capital Purchase Program, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/ 
initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/bank-investment-programs/cap/Pages/overview.aspx 
(last updated Dec. 12, 2013, 11:36 AM).  
 121. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, TARP Capital Purchase Program (Non-Public 
QFIs, Excluding S Corps and Mutual Organizations): Preferred Securities 4, http://www.treasury.gov/ 
press-center/press-releases/Documents/term%20sheet%20%20private%20c%20corporations.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 23, 2013).  
 122. See SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, AIG REMAINS 
IN TARP AS TARP’S LARGEST INVESTMENT, Q. REP.TO CONGRESS 6 (July 25, 2012), http://www 
.sigtarp.gov/Audit%20Reports/AIG_Remains_in_TARP_Mini_Book.pdf (last visited Dec. 23, 2013). 
 123. See AIG—Press Release, supra note 25.  
 124. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Elects Directors to CPP Banks’ 
Boards of Directors (July 19, 2011), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases 
/Pages/tg1249.aspx. 
 125. See TREASURY REPORT TO CONGRESS—OCT. 2012, supra note 25, at 9. 
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3. Constituency Directors as Complementary Goods 
The above discussion of constituency directors suggests that they are a 
customary feature of NCE investments in startups and declining 
corporations. Yet a unified analysis of constituency directors remains 
conspicuously absent in the corporate law scholarship.
126
 At best, legal 
scholars have mentioned that board representation may be secured in 
venture capitalist contracts or creditor contracts upon distress. 
This is a reductive account for several reasons. First, it omits 
consideration of both union-nominated directors and 
government-nominated directors, whose governance implications are 
crucial in difficult economic times like the present. 
Second, this account only conceives of constituency directors as a 
substitute good
127—a means to lower a NCE investor’s monitoring costs, 
and therefore a corporation’s cost of capital, when more ordinary means 
such as tangible assets and positive cash flows are not available for that 
purpose.
128
 While this explanation may be plausible in some cases,
129
 in 
 
 
 126. The literature on constituency directors is mostly confined to practitioners’ commentary and 
a few blog postings. See, e.g., Robert Little & Chris Babcock, Walking the High Wire: Guidelines for 
Board of Director Designees of Private Equity Funds, Activist Stockholders and Other Investors, 44 
SEC. REG. & L. REP. 2245 (2012); David M. Morris et al., Designated Directors and Designating 
Investors: Early Planning Is Key, 16 CORP. GOVERNANCE ADVISOR, May–June 2008, at 5; Moscow, 
supra note 4; E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, How Many Masters Can a Director 
Serve? A Look at the Tensions Facing Constituency Directors, 63 BUS. LAW. 761 (2008); Terence 
Woolf, Note, The Venture Capitalist’s Corporate Opportunity Problem, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
473 (discussing divided loyalty issues arising when constituency directors hold dual directorship); 
Stephen Bainbridge, Constituency Directors, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Mar. 29, 2011, 11:27 
AM), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2011/03/constituency-directors.html; 
Hinsey, supra note 106; see also R.P. Austin, Representatives and Fiduciary Responsibilities—Notes 
on Nominee Directorships and Life Arrangements, 7 BOND L. REV., June 1995, at 19 (providing a legal 
analysis of constituency directors in commonwealth countries). 
 127. N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLE OF ECONOMICS 70 (2008).  
 128. See, e.g., Triantis, supra note 104, at 314.  
 129. For example, this may be the case in private debt where the debtor is not a declining 
corporation. Recent studies observe that in thirty percent of private debt, the appointment of 
bank-affiliated directors is a regular contractual feature from the outset of the parties’ relationship. See, 
e.g., Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, Bankers on Boards: Monitoring, Conflicts of Interest, 
and Lender Liability, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 415, 416 (2001). This is consistent with the idea that investment 
specificity is one of the reasons underlying the use of constituency directors by NCE investors, since 
the bank-debtor relationship tends to develop specificity features over time. See Frederick Tung, 
Leverage in the Board Room: The Unsung Influence of Private Lenders in Corporate Governance, 57 
UCLA L. REV. 115, 117, 143–44 (2009) (suggesting that private debt involves relationship-specific 
investments). But when the debtor is not a declining corporation (or a startup), asset specificity is not 
necessarily associated with the other distinguished features (e.g., low net worth) that make the 
appointment of a constituency director necessary to fully protect the investors’ interests. In these 
contexts, it is likely that bank-appointed directors may serve as mere substitute goods. See id. at 139 
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startups and declining corporations, monitoring problems are likely to 
affect an investment’s feasibility, rather than just investment costs. Indeed, 
as explained above, in these contexts the value of monitoring increases 
while the ability of a contract to supply such monitoring effectively 
decreases.
130
  
Additionally, by framing the role of constituency directors as providing 
a mere informational function, the above account fails to consider that 
board members do not just process information, but also act on that 
information. For example, the control levers obtained by venture 
capitalists and creditors through board representation regularly carry with 
them the power to replace incumbent management and initiate 
fundamental transactions.
131
 Therefore, this Article argues that 
constituency directors are in most cases a complementary rather than a 
substitute good
132—meaning that a constituency director’s ability to access 
private information and exercise adaptive decision-making are necessary 
to make NCE investments viable where they might otherwise not be.  
Finally, by failing to fully take into account the role of constituency 
directors, current scholarly discussions also fail to consider related 
normative issues. These issues arise out of existing rules of corporate law 
under which the entitlement to residual control rights is a non-negotiable 
shareholder prerogative. As the next Part will explain, this limitation 
jeopardizes the effective use of constituency directors, harming not just 
NCE investors but also shareholders and society as a whole. 
II. THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CONSTITUENCY DIRECTORS 
This Part describes the current inefficiencies inherent to the 
appointment of constituency directors. These inefficiencies are the 
negative by-product of a pillar of corporate law: the principle that all 
directors owe undivided loyalty to the corporation and its shareholders, 
regardless of whether they have been designated by the shareholders or 
another constituency. Hence, constituency directors may be liable for 
breach of fiduciary duty if they act as the true representatives of their 
designating investors. But current rules of corporate law not only make 
things legally difficult for NCE investors, they interfere with welfare 
 
 
(arguing that the informational benefits arising from having a banker on the board economize “on 
contracting and information production costs, to the benefit of both borrower and lender”). 
 130. See supra text accompanying notes 90–92.  
 131. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 86, at 1233; Fried & Ganor, supra note 107, at 987; 
Gilson, supra note 101, at 1082. 
 132. MANKIW, supra note 127, at 70.  
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maximization. Indeed, failing to recognize that constituency directors 
serve to make NCE investments viable where they might otherwise not be, 
these rules may reduce a corporation’s access to NCE capital and, 
ultimately, lead profitable investments to go unfunded.  
A. Corporate Fiduciary Law and Its Consequences  
An analysis of the current state of the law as concerns constituency 
directors exposes the way the law fails to capture the fundamental role 
performed by constituency directors in the corporate system. 
1. The Undivided Loyalty Principle 
NCE providers plainly expect their appointed constituency directors to 
act as their representatives on the board. This expectation applies to both 
the monitoring and enforcement functions performed by constituency 
directors. As a monitoring device, constituency directors are expected to 
serve as their sponsors’ eyes and ears on the board,133 transmitting 
information about boardroom discussions and activity as well as any other 
non-public information concerning the company and its performance.
134
  
In addition, as an enforcement device, constituency directors are 
expected to act as their sponsors’ “advocates” within the firm,135 providing 
adaptive responses to unanticipated events. Such advocacy may involve 
different levels of board activity, from giving voice to the views of 
designating investors in the day-to-day management of the firm to 
strategic decision-making in response to both vertical and horizontal 
agency problems.  
 
 
 133. See Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 126, at 774; Charles M. Nathan et al., Maintaining 
Board Confidentiality, THE HARVARD L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 23, 2010, 
2:12 PM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/01/23/maintaining-board-confidentiality (stating 
that constituency directors view their role on the board as necessarily involving an obligation to keep 
their sponsors informed about company matters). 
 134. Nathan et al., supra note 133 (suggesting that constituency directors’ access to “material 
board information”, in addition to “material company information”, raises novel confidentiality issues 
that interested parties may find difficult to address effectively). 
 135. There is a robust economic literature on the informational and organizational value of 
advocacy systems, which exploit the benefits arising from the competing interaction of individuals 
who are appointed to be advocates of specific causes. See Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, 
Advocates, 107 J. POL. ECON. 1 (1999) (providing a formal discussion about the use of advocacy 
systems in various organizational contexts); see also Sepe, supra note 51, at 372–75, 394–404 
(proposing to amend prudential bank regulation to incentivize the adoption of banks’ governance 
models built around a system of advocacy).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss2/2
  
 
 
 
 
2013] INTRUDERS IN THE BOARDROOM 343 
 
 
 
 
It is worth emphasizing, however, that when NCE investors are 
quasi-residual claimants, their interests perfectly converge with those of 
the shareholders in terms of controlling the vertical problem of effort.
136
 
Thus, it is the control of horizontal agency problems—i.e., management’s 
risk choices
137—that is at the core of a constituency director’s strategic 
decision-making. This means that in situations involving a conflict of 
interest between the designating investors and the shareholders, the role 
served by constituency directors essentially entails taking actions that are 
antithetical to the interests of the shareholders.
138
  
However, these expectations of NCE investors about the role of their 
board representatives are in direct conflict with a director’s obligations 
under existing corporate fiduciary law. Indeed, a fundamental principle of 
this law—embraced by the Supreme Court as early as the nineteenth 
century
139
 and reiterated ever since by Delaware courts—is that “directors 
. . . have ‘the legal responsibility to manage the business of a corporation 
 
 
 136. To some extent, NCE investors always benefit from increased managerial effort because 
higher effort increases the likelihood of successful corporate performance and, therefore, the 
likelihood that the corporation will be able to meet its fixed obligations. See supra note 65 and 
accompanying text; see also Triantis & Daniels, supra note 38, at 1078. However, as shown by Figure 
1 above, the magnitude of this benefit varies greatly depending on whether a corporation’s net-worth is 
sufficient to insulate NCE investors from the detrimental effects of low managerial effort on asset 
value. See supra Part I.B.1. When this is the case (i.e., a company has high net worth), NCE investors 
will be less sensitive to managerial effort. In contrast, when a company has low net worth, NCE 
investors will be highly sensitive to managerial effort. This explains why in startups and declining 
corporations there is perfect convergence between NCE investors and shareholders as concerns the 
problem of managerial effort. The notable exception is the fledgling startup, where shareholder-
founders directly manage the venture and, therefore, may have incentives to exert lower effort to the 
detriment of NCE investors. 
 137. See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text.  
 138. See Baird & Henderson, supra note 28, at 1320 (suggesting that creditors’ ultimate aim in 
bargaining for board control is “to put in place directors who will not do what the shareholders want”). 
It is important to note that the ability of constituency directors to influence corporate decisions will 
vary with the level of board control they enjoy—as determined by both the ratio of constituency to 
non-constituency directors and the specific rules governing board voting. It is self-evident that 
constituency directors can unilaterally determine decisional outcomes when they hold the majority of 
board seats. But a majority of constituency directors is not strictly required to gain decisive influence 
over corporate decision-making. In cases of supermajority voting provisions, constituency directors 
may have a substantial impact on decisional outcomes even if they comprise less than a majority of the 
board. See Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 126, at 762 (providing a practical example of how, 
under a supermajority voting rule, constituency directors can determine decisional outcomes). In fact, 
because on many board issues there is a tendency to move on unanimity, even a single constituency 
director may have a role in influencing board decisions. See McKersie, supra note 114, at 239. 
 139. See Koehler v. Black River Falls Iron Co., 67 U.S. (2 Black) 715, 720–21 (1862) 
(“[Directors] hold a place of trust, and by accepting the trust are obliged to execute it with fidelity, not 
for their own benefit, but for the common benefit of the stockholders of the corporation.”); Dodge v. 
Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331, 341 (1855) (establishing that courts have authority “to restrain those 
who administer [corporations] from doing acts . . . which might result in lessening the dividends of 
stockholders, or the value of their shares”). 
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for the benefit of its shareholders owners.’ Accordingly, fiduciary duties 
are imposed upon the directors to regulate their conduct when they 
perform that function.”140 The immediate implication of this functional 
approach to corporate fiduciary duty is that, once a director has been 
elected to a corporation’s board, she owes undivided loyalty to the 
shareholders of that corporation
141—regardless of how she was nominated 
or by whom.
142
  
In practice, this means that constituency directors may be held liable 
for breach of fiduciary duty when behaving consistently with their 
sponsors’ expectations. When it comes to fulfilling their function as 
monitors, constituency directors are confronted with the burden of the duty 
of confidentiality—a corollary of the duty of loyalty that requires directors 
not to disclose confidential company information to third parties.
143
 While 
 
 
 140. N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101 (Del. 
2007) (quoting Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9 (Del. 1998)). 
 141. Delaware courts have articulated the requirement of undivided loyalty sometimes as owed 
“to the corporation” and sometimes as owed to “the corporation and its shareholders.” See Veasey & 
Di Guglielmo, supra note 126, at 764 & n.8. However, the operation of this requirement, in both 
academia and judicial opinions, has consistently identified the interests of the shareholders as proxy 
for the interest of the corporation. See Chen & Hanson, supra note 57, at 46–52 (describing the largely 
majoritarian scholarly view that pursuing the shareholder interest is the best way to pursue the 
corporation’s interest). 
 142. See Deutsch v. Cogan, No. 8808, 1989 WL 34983, at *4 (Del. Ch. April 11, 1989)(“Under 
Delaware law, a director owes an uncompromising duty of loyalty to the shareholders of the 
corporation.”); Phillips v. Insituform of N. Am., Inc., No. 9173, 1987 WL 16285, 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
774, at *790 (Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 1987) (“[T]he law demands of directors . . . fidelity to the corporation 
and all of its shareholders and does not recognize a special duty on the part of directors elected by a 
special class to the class electing them . . . .”); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 
1983) (“There is no ‘safe harbor’ for such divided loyalties in Delaware.”); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 
503, 510 (Del. 1939) (providing the classic statement of the duty of undivided loyalty, which reads as 
follows: “[t]he rule that requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation demands that 
there shall be no conflict between duty and self-interest.”); see also ABA SECTION OF BUS. LAW, 
CORPORATE DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK (2d ed. 1994), reprinted in 49 BUS. LAW. 1243, 1250 (1994) (“A 
director should exercise independent judgment for the overall benefit of the corporation and all of its 
shareholders, even if elected at the request of a controlling shareholder, a union, a creditor, or an 
institutional shareholder or pursuant to contractual rights.”). 
 143. See, e.g., Venoco, Inc. v. Eson, No. 19506-NC, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 65, at *20 (Del. Ch. 
June 6, 2002) (“It is well-settled that directors ‘are not permitted to use their position of trust and 
confidence to further their private interests’ because the law ‘requires an undivided and unselfish 
loyalty to the corporation [and] demands that there shall be no conflict between duty and 
self-interest.’”) (quoting Guth, 5 A.2d at 510); Malone, 722 A.2d at 12 (“The directors’ duty to 
disclose all available material information in connection with a request for shareholder action must be 
balanced against its concomitant duty to protect the corporate enterprise, in particular, by keeping 
certain financial information confidential.”); see also COMM. ON CORPORATE LAWS, ABA SECTION OF 
BUS. LAW, CORPORATE DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK (5th ed. 2007), reprinted in 62 BUS. LAW. 1479, 
1500 (2007) (“A director must keep confidential all matters involving the corporation that have not 
been disclosed to the public.”). 
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case law on the duty of confidentiality is sparse,
144
 commentators agree 
that constituency directors navigate in perilous waters in transmitting 
information to their sponsors in circumstances involving a conflict of 
interest between the sponsor and the corporation’s shareholders.145  
More importantly, the duty of undivided loyalty to shareholders may 
prevent constituency directors from taking actions to the exclusive benefit 
of the designating investors. Traditionally, Delaware courts have 
navigated around this duty by applying the business judgment rule, despite 
the fact that constituency directors clearly do not meet the standard 
requirements for application of the rule—independence and disinterested 
judgment.
146
 The reason for such an approach was to avoid grappling with 
the application of fiduciary duty rules to constituency directors. However, 
beginning with the 2009 groundbreaking decision in In re Trados Inc. 
Shareholder Litigation,
147
 Delaware courts have shown no such reticence 
and have begun strictly enforcing the duty of undivided loyalty, virtually 
depriving constituency directors of any effective role.  
2. The Trados Decision  
Trados involved an allegation of a breach of fiduciary duty brought by 
a common shareholder who claimed that the board, dominated by 
preferred shareholder designees,
148
 favored its own interests and the 
 
 
 144. See Cyril Moscow, Director Confidentiality, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197, 200–02 
(2011). The case law concerning the duty of confidentiality has traditionally framed such a duty as 
instrumental to prevent trading based on inside information and competitive harm rather than to deal 
with informational issues arising among corporate constituencies. See Nathan et al., supra note 133; 
Morris et al., supra note 126, at 5. More recent case law, however, has applied the duty of 
confidentiality to sanction the conduct of investors’ representatives. See, e.g., Shocking Techs., Inc. v. 
Michael, No. 7164-VCN, 2012 BL 257554, at *10–11 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2012) (director held liable for 
disclosing information to a potential investor); Venoco, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 65, at *20–21 (directors 
held liable for breach of the duty of confidentiality in assisting their sponsor to prepare an unsolicited 
bid for the company); Agranoff v. Miller, 1999 WL 219650 (Del. Ch. Apr. 12, 1999) (director found 
liable for breach of fiduciary duty in disclosing material company information to her sponsor). 
 145. See, e.g., Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 126, at 773–74; Little & Babcock, supra note 
126, at 2. But see Moscow, supra note 144, at 206–07 (suggesting that confidentiality agreements 
between the corporation and the designating investors are a sufficient instrument to protect 
constituency directors from liability for breach of the duty of confidentiality). Moscow, however, fails 
to consider that confidentiality agreements are plagued by the same contractual incompleteness issues 
that make the appointment of constituency directors necessary in the first place. This means that, in 
order to fully protect their sponsors’ expectations, constituency directors might need to transmit 
information to their sponsors in unforeseeable situations. Hence, confidentiality agreements have at 
best limited utility in insulating such directors from liability for breach of the duty of confidentiality.  
 146. See Moscow, supra note 4, at 16.  
 147. No. 1512-CC, 2009 WL 2225958 (Del. Ch. July 24, 2009).  
 148. Id. at *1. Specifically, the preferred shareholder designees occupied four out of seven board 
seats. Id. Of the remaining three seats, two were occupied by top officers and one by an independent 
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interests of the preferred shareholders at the expense of the common 
shareholders.
149
 Trados Incorporated, the company at issue, was a 
venture-capital-backed company that faced serious financial difficulties 
after some years in business.
150
 In response, the board hired a new CEO 
and, at the same time, began to explore a potential sale or merger of the 
company.
151
 In spite of a promising performance improvement, the board 
approved a merger of the company less than a year after appointing the 
new management.
152
 The preferred shareholders realized almost $52 
million in liquidation proceeds from the merger.
153
 The common 
shareholders received nothing.
154
  
The court upheld the plaintiff’s claim for purposes of denying the 
directors’ motion to dismiss.155 First, the court reasoned that the interests 
of the preferred shareholders diverged from the interests of the common 
shareholders in matters related to the merger.
156
 Indeed, the preferred 
shareholders stood to make millions from the merger while the common 
shareholders would walk away empty-handed, notwithstanding the 
legitimate expectation that their participation in Trados could have some 
future value.
157
 Based on this premise, the court framed the central issue in 
the case as concerning a director’s duties when conflicts of interest arise 
between common and preferred shareholders. Reiterating prior case law 
about the contractual nature of preferred shareholders’ rights, the court 
acknowledged that “the duty of the board, where discretionary judgment is 
to be exercised, [is] to prefer the interests of common stock . . . to the 
interests created by the special rights, preferences, etc., of preferred stock, 
where there is a conflict.”158 In Trados, the preferred shareholders had no 
 
 
director. Id. at *1–2.   
 149. Id. at *1–4.  
 150. Id. at *1–2. 
 151. Id. at *2–3. 
 152. Id. at *3–4. 
 153. Id. at *1. More precisely, the Trados merger yielded $60 million, which were allocated as 
follows: (i) $7.8 million went to top executives under a management incentive scheme that was 
designed to incentivize a merger of the company, (ii) the remaining $51.2 million went to the preferred 
shareholders under a liquidation preference provision in favor of the preferred that provided that a 
merger be deemed a liquidation event. Id. at *3.  
 154. Id.  
 155. Id. at *9. 
 156. Id. at *7. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at *7 (quoting Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040, 1042 (Del. Ch. 
1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). In reiterating the case law on the nature of preferred 
shareholders rights, the court quotes Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 594 (Del. Ch. 
1986). Id. at *7 n.39. This case sets the modern standard of review of the preferred shareholders’ 
corporate position vis-à-vis that of the common shareholders. In Jedwab, the court established that: 
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specific contractual right to force the merger.
159
 Therefore, it was possible 
that the Trados directors had breached their duty of loyalty to the common 
shareholders.
160
  
But the court’s decisive argument to deny the defendant’s motion to 
dismiss concerned the relationships between the board majority and the 
preferred shareholders. The court held, in essence, that because the 
majority of Trados directors “had an ownership or employment 
relationship with an entity that owned Trados preferred stock,”161 they 
were to be held interested in the merger and therefore, subject to the strict 
entire fairness test, rather than the much more flexible business judgment 
rule. Even more importantly to the purpose of this discussion, the court’s 
dicta indicate a perception that being a board designee of a particular 
constituency may be sufficient for a director to be incapable of exercising 
disinterested judgment.
162
 Indeed, the court explicitly noted that “a lack of 
independence can be shown by pleading facts that support a reasonable 
inference that the director is beholden to a controlling person or ‘so under 
their influence that their discretion would be sterilized.’”163 In this respect, 
 
 
[W]ith respect to matters relating to preferences or limitations that distinguish preferred stock 
from common, the duty of the corporation and its directors is essentially contractual and the 
scope of the duty is appropriately defined by reference to the specific words evidencing that 
contract; where however the right asserted is not to a preference as against the common stock 
but rather a right shared equally with the common, the existence of such right and the scope 
of the correlative duty may be measured by equitable as well as legal standards. 
Jedwab, 509 A.2d at 594. Thus, prima facie, Jedwab introduces an exception to the general rule that 
the preferred shareholders’ rights are contractual in nature. See also In re FLS Holdings, Inc. S’holders 
Litig., No. 12623, 1993 WL 104562, at *14 (Del. Ch. Apr. 2, 1993, revised Apr. 21, 1993) (holding 
that directors are obligated to treat the preferred fairly when they share a right with the common). In 
practice, however, the room for this exception has been largely limited by subsequent Delaware 
decisions, which have reemphasized the general rule that preferred rights are contractual in nature. See 
Blue Chip Capital Fund II Ltd. P’ship v. Tubergen, 906 A.2d 827, 833 (Del. Ch. 2006) (expressing the 
view that the rights of preferred shareholders are essentially contractual); Equity-Linked Investors, 
L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040, 1042 (Del. Ch. 1997) (describing the duty to pursue the interests of the 
common shareholders as the general rule governing directors’ actions); HB Korenvaes Invs., L.P. v. 
Marriott Corp., No. 12922, 1993 WL 205040, at *745 (Del. Ch. June 9, 1993) (“[T]o a very large 
extent, to ask what are the rights of the preferred stock is to ask what are the rights and obligations 
created contractually by the certificate of designation.”). See also infra note 172 and accompanying 
text. 
 159. Trados, 2009 WL 2225958, at *7 nn.38 & 42. 
 160. Id. at *7. 
 161. Id. at *8. 
 162. This interpretation of the 2009 Trados decision finds support in the recent post-trial decision 
of the case, in which the Chancery Court explicitly recognized that the preferred designees “faced a 
conflict of interest as dual fiduciaries.” See In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 1512-VCL, 2013 WL 
4511262, at *22 (Del. Ch. August 16, 2013).  
 163. Trados, 2009 WL 2225958, at *6 (quoting Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 936 (Del. 
1993)).  
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the fact that the Trados directors had “additional significant relationships 
to preferred stockholders” only made the court’s decision easier, providing 
further evidence that the directors were interested in the Trados merger.
164
 
3. The Residual Control Constraint 
The bottom line that emerges from the Trados decision is that the right 
to benefit from directors’ adaptive decision-making—what the court in 
Trados dubbed a director’s “discretionary judgment”165—follows from the 
special status shareholders enjoy in corporate law and cannot be privately 
ordered in favor of NCE investors.
166
 Such investors can, at best, restrict 
the extent of the directors’ required allegiance to shareholder interests by 
bargaining for specific control rights. But the residual control directors 
enjoy once they have honored all the corporation’s contractual obligations 
is not negotiable. It can only be exercised to the benefit of shareholders,
167
 
regardless of whether a director has been appointed by the shareholders 
themselves or another corporate constituency.  
This constraint affects both the monitoring and enforcement functions 
of constituency directors. Any right claimed by NCE investors through the 
actions of their board designees needs to be grounded on explicit 
contractual provisions, unless this right “is not to a preference as against 
the common stock but rather a right shared equally with the common 
[shareholders].”168 Thus, constituency directors will be prevented from 
disclosing information to their sponsors where a conflict of interest arises 
with the shareholders, unless the sponsors have bargained for a 
confidentiality agreement that includes a specific right to a differing 
course of action.
169
 Likewise, constituency directors will be allowed to 
 
 
 164. Id. at *8 n.43.  
 165. Id. at *7. 
 166. As stated in another oft-repeated Delaware opinion, “[t]he shareholder franchise is the 
ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial power rests.” Blasius Indus. v. Atlas 
Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988). Trados adds to this well-settled principle that a director’s 
obligation of undivided loyalty preserves the integrity of the shareholders’ exclusive right to benefit 
from directorial power. Cf. Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. 
L. REV. 595, 601–07 (1997) (characterizing the “exclusive benefit principle” as the fundamental 
predicate of the fiduciary obligation of loyalty). 
 167. See Macey, supra note 36, at 1279–80 (arguing that “fiduciary duties are themselves a form 
of residual claim. . . . [S]hareholders [are] entitled to the residual legal rights that remain after the 
nonshareholder constituencies have reached their own agreements with the corporation.”).  
 168. See Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 594 (Del. Ch. 1986).  
 169. See Morris et al., supra note 126, at 6, 9.  
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take actions contrary to the interests of the shareholders only so long as 
they are contractually entitled to do so.
170
  
Under this approach, Delaware courts have foreclosed the possibility of 
allowing for additional (i.e., non-contractually specified) protective 
mechanisms for NCE investors. Building on its prior decision in Trados, 
the Delaware Chancery Court made this point clear in its 2010 decision in 
LC Capital Master Fund.
171
 Faced again with a conflict of interest 
between common and preferred shareholders in matters relating to a 
merger, the court held that bestowing more on the preferred shareholders 
than they were contractually entitled to would “give them leverage that 
they did not fairly extract in the contractual bargain, a hold-up value of 
some kind that acts as a judicially imposed substitute for contractual 
protections that they could have, but did not obtain . . . .”172  
 
 
 170. For example, the court in Trados referred several times to the absence of a “drag-along” 
contractual provision that enabled the preferred shareholders to force through the sale of the company, 
suggesting that the case would have been dismissed in these circumstances. See In re Trados Inc. 
S’holder Litig., No. 1512-CC, 2009 WL 2225958, at *7 (Del. Ch. July 24, 2009). It bears emphasis, 
however, that commentators remain skeptical of the effectiveness of drag-along rights in Trados-like 
cases. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 29, at 1890 (“Trados disrupted the contracting field, 
impairing the operation of drag-along rights.”) (emphasis in original). Drag-along provisions provide 
for a discretionary right of a given shareholder class (e.g., the preferred shareholders) to sell or merge 
the company, by contractually securing other shareholders’ advanced promise to support the merger. 
See Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n (NVCA), Model Voting Agreement § 3, at 5–10 (Aug. 2013) 
[hereinafter Model Voting Agreement]. After Trados, however, there are significant issues with these 
provisions. First, it remains unclear whether obtaining the shareholders’ advanced consent to a merger 
is sufficient to avoid issues of directors’ self-dealing in preferred controlled boards. Second, it might 
be impossible to obtain the approval of all of a company’s “other shareholders”, especially if one 
considers that venture capital deals frequently involves several layers of investors. See Memorandum 
from Christopher L. Kaufman & Kathleen M. Wells to Law Firm Clients, Venture Capital Investing: 
Can the Liquidation Preference of Preferred Stock Over the Common Stock be Protected Where the 
Common Stock Receives Little or Nothing in an Exit? 5 (Oct. 21, 2010) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter Kaufman & Wells Memorandum]; Bratton & Wachter, supra note 29, at 1891. To address 
these issues, in 2010 the NVCA introduced a convoluted contractual alternative to standard drag-along 
rights. This alternative provides for the negotiation of a contractual pre-commitment by the company 
itself to commence a sale or merger process upon request of a given shareholder class (e.g., the 
preferred shareholders), coupled with that class’ right to redeem its shares in case of board refusal to 
approve the merger. See Model Voting Agreement, § 1.2-1.3. These provisions are finalized, on the 
one hand, to limit board involvement in conflicted situations (i.e., directly avoid the rise of Trados-like 
issues) and, on the other, to frame the possible board’s approval of a conflicted situation as a 
contractually “forced”, and therefore disinterested, decision (i.e., indirectly avoid a Trados-like issue). 
Yet, because Delaware law ultimately requires board approval of a merger, it is unclear how far one 
can go in directly limiting Trados-like director conflict issues. Kaufman & Wells Memorandum, 
supra, at 5. Moreover, in Trados-like circumstances redemption is unlikely to be a viable option, since 
companies that navigate in troubled water will most likely be unable to redeem outstanding preferred 
claims. Accordingly, the threat of redemption is unlikely to work as an effective device to make the 
board’s approval of a merger look non-interested to courts. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 29, at 
1892–93.  
 171. LC Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. James, 990 A.2d 435 (Del. Ch. 2010).  
 172. Id. at 451. In LC Capital Master Fund, Vice Chancellor Strine also clarified once and for all 
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This approach, however, misses two important points. First, there 
might be corporate situations (such as startups and declining corporations) 
where NCE investors are exposed to virtually the same contracting 
problems that common shareholders face, and for which the shareholder 
franchise and fiduciary protection provide a solution. Second, anticipating 
that bargaining for specific control rights is insufficient to protect their 
interests in these situations, NCE investors appoint constituency directors 
precisely to benefit from discretionary powers that extend beyond 
whatever contractual protections they have bargained for. 
It is thus unsurprising that Trados and its progeny have attracted a 
tremendous amount of commentary, especially from concerned private 
equity lawyers.
173
 This great deal of attention reflects the difficulties that 
NCE investors may bear under the Delaware courts’ strict adherence to the 
undivided loyalty principle.
174
  
But the limitations arising for NCE investors under current fiduciary 
rules do not just raise distributive concerns. Instead, as the next Part will 
show, they also raise allocative concerns because they may deter NCE 
investors who would otherwise invest in a project.  
 
 
that the precedents established in Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584 (Del. Ch. 1986). 
and In re FLS Holdings, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 12623, 1993 WL 104562 (Del. Ch. Apr. 2, 1993, 
revised Apr. 21, 1993), are just circumscribed exceptions to the general principle that preferred rights 
are contractual in nature. LC Capital Master Fund, 990 A.2d at 447 (“The broad language in FLS 
Holdings and Jedwab must, I think, be read against [their] factual backdrop. . . . Without this factual 
context, those opinions are otherwise in sharp tension with the great weight of our law’s precedent in 
this area.”). 
 173. See Marilyn B. Cane et al., Recent Developments Concerning Preferred Stockholder Rights 
Under Delaware Law, 5 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 377, 390 (2011); Marita Makinen et al., Acqui-Hires for 
Growth: Planning for Success, 28 VENTURE CAPITAL REV. 31, 37 (2012).  
 174. In confronting the hurdles caused by the Trados decision, most private equity lawyers have 
advised investors faced with potential conflicts of interests to call for a vote of independent (i.e., non-
constituency) directors. Some among them, however, rightly worry that even such directors may be 
obligated to prefer the common shareholders’ interests absent a specific contractual provision in the 
investors’ favor. See Kaufman & Wells Memorandum, supra note 170, at 5. More generally, because 
of the director conflict concerns raised by Trados and other similar cases, both legal advisors and the 
NVCA have strongly encouraged investors to focus on advanced planning and contractual 
specification to protect their investments. See Model Voting Agreement, supra note 170 and 
accompanying text (outlining the NVCA’s attempt to contractually avoid Trados-like circumstances); 
see also Steven M. Davidoff, A Lesson in Control, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Nov. 10, 2010, 2:59 
AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/11/10/a-lesson-in-control. Yet they have also acknowledged 
that this is a task ridden with feasibility issues, pointing out that “[t]here has been no perfect 
[contractual] solution advanced to date for the dilemma posed by these court decisions.” Kaufman & 
Wells Memorandum, supra note 170, at 4; Bratton & Wachter, supra note 29, at 1890 (arguing that 
“on the facts of Trados, no available contractual circumlocution exists”).  
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B. The Economics of Undivided Loyalty 
The limitations imposed by the principle of undivided loyalty on the 
use of constituency directors, both as a monitoring and as an enforcement 
device, have social welfare implications, which are best illustrated by a 
game theoretic hypothetical.  
1. A Game Theoretic Illustration  
Consider Del. Corp. Inc., a commercial company incorporated in 
Delaware. Del. Corp. Inc. started its business with a total asset value of 
$100, equally funded by the issuance of common shares and debt. 
However, after two years in business (“period one”), the company’s 
financial prospects have become dire. During the initial period, Del. Corp. 
Inc. has been unable to generate positive cash flows and, as a result, its 
asset value has fallen to $55. The company’s creditors, concerned with the 
negative outlook, have threatened to accelerate the repayment of debt. In 
response to these hurdles, Del. Corp. Inc.’s board has engaged in a search 
for financing and strategic options, identifying two possibilities. The first 
is to liquidate the company for $55. This option would allow the company 
to repay the outstanding debt in full but would leave the common 
shareholders with only $5. Alternatively, Del. Corp. Inc. could issue $100 
in preferred stock—carrying a fixed dividend of $20—to a private equity 
fund that specializes in distressed investments.
175
 This alternative option 
would allow the company to refinance its outstanding debt while also 
providing enough funds to enable it to continue operations for some 
additional time (“period two”). For simplicity, assume that if the board 
opts for the refinancing strategy, the business will be terminated at the end 
of period two, with the preferred shareholders having the right to receive 
their liquidation preferences (i.e., capital plus dividends) in a lump sum 
and the shareholders being entitled to the residual.
176
  
 
 
 175. See supra note 18 (discussing, among others, the rise of preferred equity investments in 
distressed debt). 
 176. Note that the above hypothetical can be easily rewritten where Del. Corp. Inc. is a startup. To 
this end, assume that Del. Corp. Inc. starts out with an equity capital of $5 in period one. This leaves 
the company in need of $100 before it can fully implement its business, e.g., the development of a new 
technological device. Further, assume that after exploring various alternatives to raise these funds, the 
company’s board is confronted with the decision of whether to issue $100 in preferred stock to venture 
capitalists who demand a dividend payment of $20. As above, further assume that the parties’ 
agreement provides for the venture capital’s cash flows to be distributed in full after period two, either 
because the company is liquidated or, alternatively, an IPO occurs. The conversion rights of venture 
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Assume now that in period two, there can be two equiprobable states of 
the world (i.e., future scenarios), State 1 and State 2. The realization of 
these states of the world depends on exogenous market conditions—what 
game theorists call “a move from nature” (or the “Nature Player”).177 
Moreover, which state of the world materializes is private information of 
the board. This means that the preferred shareholders are either unable to 
observe which state of the world will materialize in period two or verify 
the realized state of the world to a third party (e.g., the court). Hence, the 
parties cannot write a state-contingent contractual agreement. Further 
assume that under each state of the world, the board can either choose a 
conservative strategy or an expansive strategy. The former promises a 
given payoff with certainty, such as the sale of the company. The latter, 
instead, involves a riskier course of action, such as continuing to operate 
the company, and therefore involves another move from the Nature 
Player.
178
 Assume that this move can be either Good (involving a positive 
outcome for the selected course of action) or Bad (involving a negative 
outcome).  
Game theory analysis helps us to better understand how the parties in 
our hypothetical will strategically interact. Using an extensive form 
game,
179
 the order of actions and events of the example can be described 
as follows: 
1. The board moves first, deciding whether to propose (action: 
propose) or not propose (action: not propose) the contract to the 
preferred shareholders;  
2. the preferred shareholders move second by accepting (action: 
accept) or rejecting (action: reject) the board’s contract; 
3. the Nature Player plays third, randomly determining the state of 
the world, State 1 or State 2; 
 
 
capitalists are left out of the picture in order to keep the startup context comparable with the declining 
corporation context. This simplification does not affect qualitative results. 
 177. See ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION 27 (4th ed. 2007) (“Nature is a 
pseudo-player who takes random actions at specified points in the game with specified probabilities.”); 
STEVEN TADELIS, GAME THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 15 (2013) (“Nature chooses a probability 
distribution over the outcomes . . . .”).  
 178. In reality, all future states of the world involve some degree of uncertainty (i.e., a move from 
the Nature Player). For simplicity, however, I assume away the role of uncertainty when the action is 
conservative. This simplification does not affect qualitative results. 
 179. An extensive form game “models explicitly the actions that the players take, the sequence in 
which they take them, and the information they have when they take these actions.” DOUGLAS G. 
BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 50 (1994). 
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4. the board plays again deciding whether to take a conservative 
strategy (action: conservative) or an expansive strategy (action: 
expansive);  
5. only when the board plays expansive does the Nature Player play 
again, deciding with equal probability between a good state (Good) 
and a bad state (Bad). 
The game tree that follows in Figure 2 below specifies the moves 
available to each player at each point in the game and the players’ payoffs 
under the various outcomes. The tree’s “decision nodes” represent the 
different points of the game and the board’s initial decision propose/not 
propose represents the “root node” (or “initial node”) of the game. Each 
branch leaving a decision node represents a player’s “move” or “action,” 
while a complete series of actions represents a player’s “strategy.”180 In 
our game, however, only the board has multiple strategies, each of which 
includes multiple actions. The preferred shareholders, instead, only have 
two strategies, each of which is a simple action (i.e., refuse or accept). 
Note that we do not consider the Nature Player here because her 
introduction basically serves to represent uncertainty about the future. That 
is, the Nature Player selects strategies randomly—based on probability 
distributions rather than payoff strategies. The pair of numbers at each 
endpoint of the tree (the “leaf” or “terminal nodes”) represents the players’ 
payoff, expressed as gross returns. The left-hand number is the payoff to 
the common shareholders as “owners” of Del. Corp. Inc.181 The right-hand 
number is the payoff to the preferred shareholders. 
 
 
 180. See RASMUSEN, supra note 177, at 27, 31.  
 181. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (describing the special status enjoyed by 
shareholders as holders of property rights and the rationale for this status).  
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In order to solve the game and identify the parties’ equilibrium 
strategies, we proceed by backward induction. This means that we start 
from the end of the tree and move back towards the beginning (the “root 
node”) to compute optimal actions.182 In practice, we first assign to the last 
player the choice that maximizes her expected payoff then we move to the 
second-to-last player and, based on the last player’s choice, we determine 
the choice that maximizes the second-to-last player’s expected payoff, and 
so on. For the reasons explained above, we leave aside the Nature Player’s 
“choice” of Bad or Good and we make the board the last player, which has 
to decide whether to play conservative or expansive. In computing the 
 
 
 182. See DREW FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY 67–69 (1991). 
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board’s actions, we assume a rule of the game183 consistent with the 
principle of undivided loyalty and requiring all directors to exercise 
residual control to the exclusive benefit of the common shareholders.
184
  
In State 1, we assign the action expansive to the board because the 
common shareholders’ expected payoff from this action is (50% * $0)+ 
(50% * $50) = $25, while it is only $20 from conservative. In State 2, we 
also assign expansive to the board because the common shareholders’ 
expected payoff is (50% * $0) + (50% * $40) = $20 from this action, while 
it is $0 from conservative. Hence, the board will always choose expansive, 
regardless of whether the Nature Player chooses State 1 or State 2. Under 
this outcome, we move to compute the preferred shareholders’ strategy. 
Under (State 1, expansive) the preferred shareholders expect to receive 
(50% * $10) + (50% * $120) = $65. Under (State 2, expansive), they 
expect to receive (50% * $50) + (50% * $120) = $85. Hence, the preferred 
shareholders’ overall expected payoff from investing in Del. Corp. Inc. is 
equal to (50% * $65) + (50% * $85) = $75, which is clearly below their 
reservation utility
185
 ($100). This implies that the preferred shareholders 
will always play refuse, with the result that the common shareholders will 
only receive their reservation utility ($5).  
For the purposes of this discussion, it is important to emphasize that no 
feasible dividend increase can induce the preferred shareholders to accept 
the contract under a “rule of the game” that requires the board to exercise 
its residual control power to the exclusive benefit of the common 
shareholders. This is because, under the board’s expansive strategy, the 
overall expected cash flows produced by Del. Corp. Inc. are below the 
preferred shareholders’ reservation utility. Indeed, expected cash flows are 
(50% * $10) + (50% * $170) = $90 under (State 1, expansive) and (50% * 
$50) + (50% * $160) = $105 under (State 2, expansive). Hence, overall 
expected cash flow under expansive equals (50% * $90) + (50% * $105) = 
$97.5, which is below the preferred shareholders’ reservation utility 
($100).  
 
 
 183. See Fama & Jensen, supra note 55, at 302 (describing the combination of internal contracts 
and external legal constraints that specify the agents’ rights, performance criteria, and payoff functions 
as rules of the game).  
 184. Under the current doctrine of undivided loyalty, this rule would remain unchanged even if the 
preferred shareholders gained control of the board through the appointment of a majority of 
constituency directors. See supra Part II.A.2. For convenience, however, in this first part of our 
hypothetical we assume that the board does not include constituency directors.  
 185. The reservation utility is the minimum level of utility the principal needs to guarantee the 
agent for the latter to accept the principal’s contract. 
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This result flies in the face of conventional assumptions that protecting 
NCE investors ultimately comes down to bargaining for the right 
price-based compensatory mechanisms.
186
 Indeed, these mechanisms 
might be unavailable in the absence of sufficient “pleadgeable income”—
visible asset value (whether actual or expected)—backing a corporation’s 
obligations.
187
 Further, as the next section will illustrate, this result 
suggests that where such mechanisms are unavailable to protect the 
interests of NCE investors—as is likely to be the case in start-ups and 
declining corporations—the appointment of unconstrained constituency 
directors might be a necessary condition for NCE investments to take 
place.  
2. Social Welfare Maximization 
Suppose now that anticipating the preferences of the board for 
expansive strategies, the preferred shareholders bargain for the 
appointment of a number of constituency directors that is sufficient to 
obtain board control. Further suppose that this move can change the rules 
of the game, allowing constituency directors to exercise their residual 
control over the corporation in the exclusive interest of the preferred 
shareholders. Proceeding again by backward induction, we first compute 
whether the board, as the last player, will play conservative or expansive 
under this different rule. In State 1 we assign to the board the action 
conservative because the preferred shareholders’ expected payoff from this 
action is $120, while it is only (50% * $10) + (50% * $120) = $65 from 
expansive. In State 2 we also assign to the board the action conservative 
because the preferred shareholders’ expected payoff from this action is 
$100, while it is only (50% * $50) + (50% * $120) = $85 from expansive. 
Hence, a board composed by a majority of constituency directors will 
always choose a conservative strategy, regardless of whether the Nature 
Player chooses State 1 or State 2. Under this different outcome for the 
board’s strategy, it is easy to see that the preferred shareholders will 
always play accept. This is because, with a board controlled by 
constituency directors, the overall expected cash flows produced by Del. 
Corp. Inc. are (50% * $120) + (50% * $100) = $110, which is higher than 
the preferred shareholders’ reservation utility ($100).  
 
 
 186. See Macey, supra note 45, at 39 (arguing that the issue in protecting the interests of NCE 
investors is not whether these investors “can protect themselves via contract, but whether they are 
willing to pay for such protection”).  
 187. See TIROLE, supra note 16, at 116–17. 
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Hence, the appointment of constituency directors who are free to 
pursue partisan interests makes the investment worth undertaking for the 
preferred shareholders in a situation where it would otherwise not be. But 
what matters most is that the appointment of unconstrained constituency 
directors also benefits the common shareholders. Indeed, the participation 
of the preferred shareholders increases the common shareholders’ 
expected payoff. While the common shareholders receive only their 
reservation utility, $5, when the preferred play refuse, they receive (50% * 
$20) + (50% * $0) = $10 when the preferred play accept.  
This simple example shows that, by depriving constituency directors of 
the ability to act as representatives of their sponsors, the obligation of 
undivided loyalty may ultimately jeopardize the very interests of 
shareholders. This occurs because the current approach to pursuing 
shareholder welfare (as a proxy for overall welfare)
188
 focuses only on part 
of the events and actions occurring in the game between the shareholders 
and NCE investors: ex post conflicting decision-making. But it overlooks 
the ex ante bargaining part of the game. Using our hypothetical again to 
better illustrate this, we can say that current corporate fiduciary duty rules 
evaluate shareholder welfare by taking into consideration only the 
subgame that starts at the intermediate decision node (conservative, 
expansive)
189—overlooking that the overall game starts, instead, at the root 
node (propose, not propose).
190
  
Thus, the question in Trados should not have been whether the 
common shareholders would have been better or worse off had the merger
 
 
 188. See supra note 141 (explaining that legal scholars as well as courts have consistently 
identified shareholder interests as the best proxy for overall welfare). 
 189. A subgame is “[a] node or a set of nodes of an extensive form game that can be viewed in 
isolation.” BAIRD ET AL., supra note 179, at 316 (emphasis in the original). 
 190. It is important to observe that this approach to interinvestor conflicts radically departs from 
recent scholarly proposals suggesting that enterprise value maximization should be the benchmark of 
directorial conduct. See, e.g., Bratton & Wachter, supra note 29, at 1885–86 (suggesting that enterprise 
value maximization should replace stock value maximization as the benchmark of directors’ conduct); 
Baird & Henderson, supra note 27, at 1328 (suggesting that most law and economics scholars favor 
the adoption of a firm-maximization norm over the current replacement of the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm). As pointed out by the Delaware Chancery Court in the Trados post-trial decision, 
the enterprise approach is ill suited to serve as a proxy for overall wealth maximization because—
among other problems—is difficult to administer and, therefore, likely to introduce uncertainty in the 
corporate landscape. See In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 1512-VCL, 2013 WL 4511262, at *18 
n.16 (Del. Ch. Aug. 16, 2013). By sticking to the shareholder wealth maximization norm, the approach 
to interinvestor conflicts advocated by this Article avoids these problems. At the same time, however, 
it eliminates the inefficiency raised by the current, limited reading of this norm, which is likely to 
jeopardize rather than advance shareholder interests in Trados-like circumstances. 
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not occurred, as the court assumed.
191
 Instead, it should have been whether 
the shareholders would have been better or worse off without the preferred 
financing—which would have likely been unavailable had the preferred 
shareholders anticipated that their board designees were not entitled to 
approve a merger of the company unless it also benefitted the common 
shareholders. This different approach to the economics of the parties’ 
exchange exposes the fact that satisfying the participation constraint of 
NCE investors is the first-order problem for shareholders. Vesting 
constituency directors with the power to exercise residual control in favor 
of their sponsors, potentially even at the shareholders’ expense, is a 
necessary condition to satisfy this constraint. Thus, in similar 
circumstances, shifting residual control rights from shareholders to NCE 
investors is a means to serve rather than jeopardize shareholder interests. 
These observations suggest that the obligation of undivided loyalty 
may stand in the way of welfare-maximizing contractual solutions and 
reduce a corporation’s ability to attract NCE capital. From this 
perspective, the risk that the shift of residual control rights from 
shareholders to NCE investors may, in some circumstances, result in 
value-decreasing ex post decisions is a second-order problem. Indeed, 
because of their fixed payoff structure, NCE investors may prefer 
conservative (i.e., lower risk) actions even when the undertaking of riskier 
actions yields higher overall expected payoff.
192
 But this risk cannot be 
placed on equal footing with the risk that such investors may walk away 
from a prospective exchange. One must first consider whether conditions 
exist for an exchange to take place; only then can one consider whether 
there is room for increasing the gains from that exchange. Moreover, as 
the next Part will explain, Coasean bargaining (i.e., efficient renegotiation) 
will generally be available to redress the potential ex post downside that 
shifting residual control rights to NCE investors may engender.
193
   
 
 
 191. See In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 1512-CC, 2009 WL 2225958, at *7 (Del. Ch. July 
24, 2009). 
 192. See Fried & Ganor, supra note 107, at 994–95. (“Because of the preferred shareholders' 
liquidation preferences . . . . preferred-dominated boards may favor immediate ‘liquidity events' (such 
as dissolution or sale of the business) even if operating the firm as a stand-alone going concern would 
generate more value for shareholders.”); Bratton & Wachter, supra note 29, at 1186 (“Preferred, as a 
senior claim, will avoid taking value-enhancing risk in a case where common, as the at-the-margin 
residual interest, would assume the risk.”). 
 193. The contracting part of the Coase Theorem states that parties will find it efficient to contract 
around externalities in order to reach a Pareto improvement. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social 
Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). In more general terms, this means that parties facing an inefficient 
outcome will have incentives to renegotiate their respective entitlements to reach a value-maximizing 
result. 
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3. Coasean Bargaining  
We have seen that a board with a majority of constituency directors 
will always choose the action conservative over the action expansive. This 
is because, under the preferred shareholders’ payoff structure, conservative 
is always more profitable for them than expansive. However, from a social 
welfare perspective, taking conservative is only efficient upon the 
realization of State 1—when the overall cash flow value associated with 
this action is $140, while that associated with expansive is (50% * $10) 
+ (50% * $170) = $90. This is not so upon the realization of State 2—
when the overall cash flow value associated with conservative is $100, 
while that associated with expansive is (50% * $50) + (50% * $160) 
= $105. Therefore, vesting constituency directors with the ability to further 
the interests of the preferred shareholders leads to a welfare loss of $5 
upon the realization of State 2. 
It is reasonable to infer, however, that in similar circumstances there 
would be room for Coasean bargaining between the parties. This is 
because the expected benefit accruing to the preferred shareholders from 
the board’s choice of conservative over expansive in State 2 is lower than 
the loss accruing to the common shareholders: $100 − $85 < $20. Hence, 
the parties will have incentives to renegotiate their original agreement so 
that choosing expansive in State 2 would make both the preferred 
shareholders and the common shareholders better off. To satisfy this 
condition, the common shareholders should leave part of the surplus 
generated by the choice of expansive under State 2 ($5) to the preferred. 
Specifically, the preferred shareholders’ expected payoff under (State 2, 
expansive) should be equal to the amount they would receive under (State 
2, conservative) ($100) plus half of the surplus ($2.5).
194
 In practice, this 
would require an ex post increase of the preferred shareholders’ dividends 
from $20 to $55. Under this dividend increase, if expansive is successful 
(i.e., the Nature Player chooses Good), the preferred shareholders would 
now obtain $155. Hence, the expected value to the preferred of (State 2, 
expansive) would become (50% * $50) + (50% * $155) = $102.5, which is 
higher than the $100 they would obtain under (State 2, conservative). 
Similarly, the expected value for the common shareholders would increase 
from $0, which is what they would receive under (State 2, conservative), 
to (50% * $0) + [50% * ($160 − $155)] = $2.5 under (State 2, expansive). 
 
 
 194. Here the assumption is that the parties have equal bargaining power, which leads to the Nash 
bargaining solutions of splitting the renegotiation surplus equally. See infra note 208 (defining Nash 
equilibrium). 
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It is worth mentioning a final note about the possibility that efficient 
renegotiation may fail. While in principle the availability of more gains 
from trade should always lead to the efficient reallocation of the parties’ 
entitlements, in practice one cannot exclude the possibility that 
renegotiation may fail in some circumstances.
195
 This may be the case if, 
for example, bargaining over the division of the renegotiation surplus 
requires excessive time and resources relative to the size of the NCE 
investment in the corporation.
196
 But the risk that renegotiation may fail 
does not alter the bottom line in the discussion: the ex ante benefits arising 
from vesting constituency directors with the ability to further their 
sponsors’ interests outweighs the potential ex post downside that may 
arise from this contracting model. Put another way, in order to satisfy the 
participation constraint of NCE investors, the shareholders need to bear 
the risk that ex post renegotiation may fail.  
C. Monitoring and Contract Self-Enforcement  
The above example has assumed that the preferred shareholders need to 
gain board control in order to fully protect their interests. In practice, 
however, NCE investors often employ contracting models that rely on the 
appointment of only a minority of constituency directors. Under these 
contracting models, designating investors expect constituency directors to 
provide them with information on ex ante unforeseeable contingencies, 
facilitating the effective use of specific contractual protections. In this 
light, slightly amending the rules of the game for NCE investors—by 
releasing constituency directors from confidentiality strictures—would 
seem sufficient to eliminate current inefficiencies facing corporate actors. 
But the frictions arising from confidentiality strictures are not the only 
problem that may affect this alternative function of constituency directors. 
 
 
 195. Some commentators have observed that information asymmetry between the preferred 
shareholders controlling the board and the common shareholders may prevent efficient renegotiation. 
See Fried & Ganor, supra note 107, at 997–99. However, unless the board includes only constituency 
directors—which is a remote possibility—the common shareholders will be able to rely on their own 
designated directors for regular information on board and company matters. See infra Part II.C. Hence, 
information asymmetry is unlikely to represent a major obstacle to efficient renegotiation between the 
parties in corporate contexts including constituency directors. 
 196. Indeed, this appears to have been one of the reasons why the preferred shareholders in 
Trados decided to go ahead with the merger in spite of the company’s improved performance. See 
Trados, 2009 WL 2225958, at *2 n.2. More generally, we can say that “the seemingly irrational act of 
shutting down an economically viable entity is rational when viewed from the perspective of the 
venture capitalist confronted with allocating time and capital among various projects.” William A. 
Sahlman, The Structure and Governance of Venture–Capital Organizations, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 473, 507 
n.12 (1990).  
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This is because access to private information might be insufficient to make 
contractual protections effective, absent bargaining levers that can make 
those protections self-enforcing. Constituency directors can reduce 
informational problems arising between contracting parties but are 
unhelpful when it comes to verifying information to third parties (i.e., 
courts). And, as noted above, verifiability issues may potentially 
compromise the ability of courts to properly enforce contracts in contexts 
where asymmetric information is significant, such as
 
startups and 
declining corporations.
197
 
The fact that some NCE investors systematically employ contracting 
models in which the function of constituency directors is not finalized to 
obtain board control suggests that these investors enjoy sufficient 
bargaining levers to make their contractual protections self-enforcing. For 
example, it is self-evident that the ability of the government to make 
recourse to regulatory measures helps to minimize the need for ex post 
judicial enforcement. Indeed, the threat of retributory regulatory 
interventions or other government actions will be sufficient in most cases 
to ensure that the contractual protections the government has bargained for 
have teeth. It is thus unsurprising that under TARP programs, the U.S. 
government has opted to use constituency directors in their monitoring 
function.
198
 Combined with the large body of prudential rules at the 
government’s disposal to regulate bank conduct,199 the access to private 
bank information provided by government-appointed directors becomes a 
fully viable mechanism to ensure effective investment protection.  
The ability to strike offers unionized workers a functionally similar 
lever to make collective contracts self-enforcing. While, in practice, strikes 
are relatively infrequent in the United States, they nonetheless constitute a 
valid tool to make contracts self-enforcing. As long as the threat of a strike 
and its attendant negative effects on production are credible, its existence 
will produce an equilibrium under which contractual protections are 
effective. In this respect, data from the 1998 General Motor (GM) strike is
 
 
 197. See supra text accompanying note 93.  
 198. See supra notes 118–25 and accompanying text.  
 199. Prudential regulation comprises the system of key requirements and restrictions that 
regulators employ to maintain the solvency of financial institutions. For a general discussion of the 
basic principles of the prudential regulation of banks in the United States, see RICHARD SCOTT 
CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (4th ed. 2009). 
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telling. The strike cost GM $809 million
200
 and caused a U.S. market share 
loss of about ten percent.
201
 This was compounded by adverse effects on 
satellite businesses as well as negative macroeconomic impacts, producing 
a direct decline in the 1998 U.S. GDP growth.
202
 And while the 2007 
national GM strike only lasted two days, it cost GM $100 million per 
day.
203
 Therefore, as with the government, a constituency director’s 
monitoring function is likely to be sufficient to ensure effective protection 
of unionized workers’ interests, which is consistent with the observed 
practice of union-nominated directors.
204
  
But, in general, the very same features that make the appointment of 
constituency directors desirable may limit the availability of self-enforcing 
mechanisms.
205
 This may potentially frustrate the effectiveness of 
contracting models that rely only on a constituency director’s monitoring 
for protecting the interests of NCE investors.  
As an illustration, let us modify the hypothetical from Part II.B.1 as 
follows. First, let us assume the preferred shareholders bargain only for the 
appointment of one constituency director, whom they expect to fulfill an 
informational role. This means that, while the rule that requires the board 
to give their loyalty exclusively to the common shareholders remains 
unchanged, the preferred shareholders will now receive information 
contingent on both the board’s strategy and the moves of the Nature Player 
(i.e., future states of the world). Second, anticipating the board’s 
preference for expansive strategies, let us assume that the preferred 
shareholders bargain for a right to accelerate the preferred stock financing 
should the board adopt an expansive strategy without their consent. Third, 
the Nature Player chooses State 1. Fourth, the exercise of the preferred 
shareholders’ acceleration right under State 1 triggers the company’s 
piecemeal liquidation, yielding overall cash flows of $50.   
 
 
 200. Michael Ellis, GM, Hit by Strikes, Reports $809 Million Q3 Loss, REUTERS NEWS, Oct. 13, 
1998, available at WESTLAW. 
 201. Michael Ellis, GM Hopes to Gain Back Market Share by Year-end, REUTERS NEWS, Oct. 5, 
1998, available at WESTLAW.  
 202. Keith Bradsher, U.A.W. Strike Is Being Felt Far from Flint: Economists Cut Back U.S. 
Growth Estimates, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1998, at D1.  
 203. James Quinn, GM Hit by First National Car Strike in 31 Years, THE TELEGRAPH (Sept. 25, 
2007, 12:01 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/markets/2816470/GM-hit-by-first-national-car-
strike-in-31-years.html.  
 204. See Appelbaum & Hunter, supra note 112, at 281 (observing that boards including union 
representatives “have one or more directors, but fewer than a majority, nominated by a union”). 
 205. See supra text accompanying notes 94–96. 
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In order to compute optimal actions, we start this time by representing 
the game between the board and the preferred shareholders in its strategic 
form through the payoff matrix in Figure 3 below.
206
 
 
Under this modified version of the hypothetical, both players have two 
strategies, each including only a simple action. The board can choose 
either conservative or expansive. The preferred shareholders can choose 
either acceleration or no acceleration. Expected payoffs are indicated in 
the matrix’s interior, with the left-hand number indicating the common 
shareholders’ expected payoff and the right-hand number indicating the 
preferred shareholders’ expected payoff. If the preferred shareholders 
choose no acceleration, the parties’ expected payoffs will remain the same 
as in the game described in Part II.B.1.
207
 Instead, if the preferred 
shareholders choose acceleration when the board plays expansive, Del. 
Corp. Inc. is liquidated and the cash flows (i.e., $50) are entirely captured 
by the preferred shareholders.  
This matrix shows that there are two Nash equilibria in which each 
player makes the best possible decision taking into account the other’s 
decision:
208
 (expansive, no acceleration) and (conservative, acceleration). 
Thus, one would assume that by playing acceleration, the preferred 
shareholders can induce the board to play conservative even when the 
 
 
 206. Strategic form games (or normal form games) model interaction between parties assuming 
that each party plays simultaneously without knowing the actions of the other party. See BAIRD ET AL., 
supra note 179, at 6–9. 
 207. If the board chooses conservative, the expected payoffs of the common shareholders and the 
preferred shareholders are $20 and $120; if the board chooses expansive, the parties’ expected payoffs 
change to $25 and $65 respectively.  
 208. A Nash equilibrium (or bargaining solution) is one in which no single player could do better 
by changing her strategy if the other players stick to their own strategies. See John F. Nash, Jr., 
Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games, 36 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 48, 48–49 (1950). 
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board acts as representative of the common shareholders. But is this 
equilibrium sub-game perfect?
209
 That is, does the equilibrium 
(conservative, acceleration) involve credible actions for each subset of 
sequentially ordered choices available to the parties? The answer to these 
questions can be obtained by transforming the game into its extensive 
form. To this end, consider the game tree represented in Figure 4 below.
210
 
 
Solving the game again by backward induction, we assign to the 
preferred shareholders, as the last player, the action no acceleration, since 
their expected payoff under this action is $65, while it is only $50 under 
acceleration. Under this outcome of the preferred shareholders’ strategy, it 
is easy to see that the board will always choose expansive because the 
common shareholders’ expected payoff is higher under this action than 
under conservative ($25 against $20). This shows that only the equilibrium 
(expansive, no acceleration) is sub-game perfect. Instead, the equilibrium 
(conservative, acceleration) involves a move by the preferred shareholders 
(i.e., acceleration) that is not credible. Liquidation, in fact, is not just 
costly for the common shareholders, but also for the preferred 
 
 
 209. A Nash equilibrium is sub-game perfect “if the players’ strategies constitute a Nash 
equilibrium in every subgame.” See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 179, at 316 (emphasis in the original).  
 210. Note that here, the tree’s terminal nodes represent the players’ expected, rather than actual, 
payoff: the left-hand number is the expected payoff to the common shareholders; the right-hand 
number is the expected payoff to the preferred shareholders. 
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shareholders, with the result that the latter prefer conservative to expansive 
but also expansive to liquidation.  
This simple hypothetical shows that freeing constituency directors from 
confidentiality strictures might not always be sufficient to remedy the 
inefficiencies arising under existing corporate fiduciary duty rules. To 
better promote this goal, constituency directors should be released from 
the obligation of undivided loyalty as a whole. The discussion that follows 
attempts to outline the directions corporate law should take to implement 
this change. 
III. CORPORATE LAW, PARTY AUTONOMY, AND THE POST-MODERN 
CORPORATION 
Economic analysis suggests that contracting models that allow 
constituency directors to act as their sponsors’ representatives respond to 
the first-order problem of facilitating a corporation’s access to NCE 
capital. But existing corporate fiduciary duty rules ignore these models, 
admitting no modification to the principle that all directors owe undivided 
loyalty to shareholders. True to Berle and Means’s classic view of the 
corporation
211
 and its central concern with securing huge inputs of capital 
from many dispersed shareholders,
212
 these rules conceive of the principle 
of undivided loyalty as the bulwark of shareholder protection against 
opportunistic managers. Viewed through this lens, it should come as no 
surprise that corporate law is almost exclusively focused on vertical 
agency problems
213
 and the contract’s failure to fully address such 
problems. It is assumed that addressing these problems is vital to ensure 
the continuing existence of the corporation.
214
 In contrast, horizontal 
 
 
 211. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 8, at 86–88. 
 212. See supra note 14.  
 213. See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 32, at 50 (“[C]orporate scholarship has focused primarily on the 
agency relationship between shareholders and managers in modern public corporations.”) (footnote 
omitted); Blair & Stout, supra note 29, at 248–49 (describing the conventional view that “the central 
economic problem addressed by corporation law is reducing ‘agency costs’ by keeping directors and 
managers faithful to shareholders’ interests”); David Millon, Communitarians, Contractarians, and the 
Crisis in Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373, 1374 (1993) (“Managerial accountability to 
shareholders is corporate law's central problem. Nonshareholder interests, if entitled to any legal 
protection at all, are for other, noncorporate law legal regimes.”); Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and 
Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923, 929 (1984) (defining the agency problem between 
managers and shareholders as the “master problem” of the modern corporation). 
 214. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of 
the Corporate Board, 79 WASH U. L.Q. 403, 405 (2001) (“The idea that shareholders alone are the 
raison d’être of the corporation dominates contemporary discussion . . . .”). 
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agency problems are seen as subordinate at best,
215
 in both significance 
and magnitude, and, in any event, as manageable by contract. 
This model, however, is increasingly ill-suited to manage the sheer 
complexity of the post-modern corporation. In the last thirty to forty years, 
radical changes have occurred in corporate capital structures.
216
 NCE 
capital, both in the form of debt and hybrid financial instruments, has 
grown into a steady, and often primary, source of corporate funding.
217
 
Corporate production has likewise undergone huge transformations. 
Corporations born out of the industrial age derived most of their value 
from physical assets and manufacturing activities. Instead, in the post-
modern corporation, firm value increasingly depends on intangible assets, 
such as technological know-how, patents, research and development 
projects, brand names, or trade secrets.
218
 Along the same lines, human 
capital has grown away from its neoclassical representation as an 
unspecified input
219
 into an increasingly specialized corporate resource.
220
 
 
 
 215. See Bartlett, supra note 32, at 39, 108 (suggesting that horizontal agency problems have been 
traditionally excluded from corporate law discussion about the modern public corporation). 
 216. See Merton H. Miller, Financial Innovation: The Last Twenty Years and the Next, 21 J. FIN. 
& QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 459, 460–63 (1986).  
 217. Richard Kopcke and Eric Rosengren have observed that during the last decade of the 1980s, 
corporations replaced “more than one-sixth of their outstanding stock with debt securities” and that 
such securities increasingly included hybrid features. Richard W. Kopcke & Eric S. Rosengren, Are 
the Distinctions Between Debt and Equity Disappearing? An Overview, in ARE THE DISTINCTIONS 
BETWEEN DEBT AND EQUITY DISAPPEARING? PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE HELD AT MELVIN 
VILLAGE, N.H., OCTOBER 1989 1, 1 (Richard W. Kopcke & Eric S. Rosengren eds., 1989). Since the 
1980s, this trend continued apace. For example, a recent study by Aswath Damodaran reports that in 
industrial sectors such as bank and financial services, maritime, power, property management, and 
telecommunication utilities, the level of leverage is higher than fifty percent of the firm’s capital 
structure. Aswath Damodaran, Debt Fundamentals by Sector, DAMODARAN ONLINE (Jan. 2013), 
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/dbtfund.htm.  
 218. A recent study by Leonard Nakamura shows that production from intangible-driven sectors, 
such as medical care, personal business services, education and research, and religious and welfare 
services has grown from ten percent in 1947 to about thirty percent in 2006. Leonard I. Nakamura, 
Intangible Assets and National Income Accounting 4–5 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Working Paper 
No. 08-23, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1285048. 
Correspondingly, investments in mass-production industries with tangible assets, such as agriculture, 
mining, manufacturing, transportation, and utilities, have declined from forty-nine percent of overall 
U.S. production in 1947 to a mere twenty percent in 2007. Id. at 4 (reporting Zvi Griliches’s data); see 
also Leonard I. Nakamura, What Is the U.S. Gross Investment in Intangibles? (At Least) One Trillion 
Dollar a Year! (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 01-15, 2001), available at 
http://www.phil.frb.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2001/wp01-15.pdf (presenting 
empirical evidence that U.S. corporations invest at least $1 trillion annually in intangibles). 
 219. See, e.g., Lester G. Telser & Harlow N. Higinbotham, Organized Future Markets: Costs and 
Benefits, 85 J. POL. ECON. 969, 997 (1977) (describing the neoclassical view according to which “[i]n 
an organized market the participants trade a standardized contract such that each unit of the contract is 
a perfect substitute for any other unit”). 
 220. In post-neoclassical economic theory, investments in human capital are modeled as one of 
the most significant contributors to economic growth. See, e.g., Paul M. Romer, Endogenous 
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Viewed through this lens, the “hybridization” of many corporate structures 
has been a response to, among other factors,
221
 the novel risk-sharing 
issues posed by the changes occurring in corporate production.
222
 The 
almost exclusive use of convertible preferred shares to finance venture 
capital deals
223
 provides the paradigmatic example of how technological 
changes have combined to shape capital structures that radically depart 
from the all-equity corporation of the Berle and Means’ era. 
In this corporate environment, the law’s exclusive focus on 
shareholder-manager conflicts is increasingly out of step with the actuality 
of many corporate contexts. Horizontal agency problems in today’s 
corporations have become as compelling as vertical agency problems, if 
not more. However, as shown by the discussion in Part II, current 
corporate fiduciary rules risk compromising the ability of corporate actors 
to devise welfare-maximizing solutions to such problems. In response, 
some scholars have suggested that “it may make sense to eliminate the 
concept of fiduciary duty from corporate law altogether.”224 While 
attractive, this solution overlooks the fact that the rationale for requiring 
directors to be loyal to shareholders—the severe incompleteness issues 
affecting the shareholders’ corporate contract—is still applicable to the 
majority of corporate situations, although the economic significance of 
these contexts has radically decreased. 
This Part suggests that a better approach to address the inefficiencies 
currently facing corporate actors would be to focus on reconciling 
corporate law and party autonomy. There is a normative case to be made 
for turning the duty of undivided loyalty into a default rule that parties 
could opt out of by appointing constituency directors. Enabling 
constituency directors to serve as their sponsors’ board representatives 
while concurrently avoiding a complete disruption of corporate fiduciary 
rules, this reform intervention would bridge the gap between corporate 
 
 
Technological Change, 98 J. POL. ECON. S71 (1990).  
 221. See Franklin Allen, The Changing Nature of Debt and Equity: A Financial Perspective, in 
ARE THE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN DEBT AND EQUITY DISAPPEARING, supra note 217, at 12–38 
(providing a critical overview of the various factors that have been advanced in finance theory to 
explain financial innovations, including tax reasons, bankruptcy costs, signaling theories, and 
economic and control rights allocations). 
 222. See, e.g., John D. Finnerty, Financial Engineering in Corporate Finance: An Overview, 17 
FIN. MGMT., Winter 1988, at 14. 
 223. See, e.g., WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CORPORATE FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 741 (7th ed. 
2012); METRICK & YASUDA, supra note 12, at 163; Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer, 
Understanding Venture Capital Structure: A Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 
HARV. L. REV. 874, 875 (2003). 
 224. Baird & Henderson, supra note 28, at 1315. 
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practice and corporate law, to the benefit of all involved parties and, 
ultimately, society as a whole.  
A. Enhancing Party Autonomy  
Under the current corporate fiduciary regime, a director’s obligation of 
loyalty to the common shareholders cannot be contractually altered.
225
 
Hence, “despite the directors’ designation by some particular constituency, 
. . . fiduciary duties generally will trump contractual expectations in the 
corporate context.”226 But there is more to this story. As a result of the 
mandatory nature of directors’ loyalty obligations, NCE investors may 
give up their investment expectations altogether, deciding to walk away 
from a prospective investment.  
This Article thus suggests that a director’s obligation of undivided 
loyalty to shareholders should be turned into a default rule that corporate 
actors would be free to bargain out of. In practice, corporate actors—NCE 
investors, on the one hand, and incumbent boards representing 
shareholders, on the other—should be free to bargain for contractual 
arrangements under which constituency directors are allowed to exercise 
residual control to the exclusive benefit of their sponsors. Under this 
waiver of the duty of loyalty, constituency directors would be vested with 
the ability to both provide their sponsors with full information about board 
and company matters and act in their sponsors’ interests in situations 
where they conflict with those of shareholders. The only limits on the 
monitoring and enforcement functions of constituency directors would 
arise from the specific limits bargained for by the incumbent board in 
agreeing to their appointment.  
In other words, opting out of the duty of loyalty would reverse the 
current allocation of property rights, under which directors are obligated to 
exercise residual control over the corporation to the exclusive benefit of 
shareholders unless required to do otherwise by a specific contractual 
 
 
 225. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1481 
(1989) (“[T]he corporation’s directors and officers have a duty of loyalty to the corporation that cannot 
be substantially altered.”). There are, however, a few statutory exceptions to this rule. For example, 
Delaware law permits advance renunciation of “specified business opportunities or specified classes or 
categories of business opportunities” by express provision in the corporation’s certificate of 
incorporation or by action of its board of directors. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(17) (West 2011). 
Further, in several states—including Delaware—opting out of the fiduciary duty of loyalty is an active 
possibility in the context of limited liability companies. See 1 LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. 
KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 524–25 (2d ed. 2011) (listing 
eighteen states as permitting full power to waive fiduciary duty).  
 226. Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 126, at 774. 
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provision in favor of NCE investors. For example, under the current 
regime, constituency directors are required to keep material information 
confidential unless disclosure is specifically authorized by the parties’ 
confidentiality agreement.
227
 Under the proposal put forth here, instead, 
constituency directors could disclose any material information to their 
sponsors unless a confidentiality agreement specifically prevented them 
from doing so.  
From the shareholders’ perspective, this proposal would come with the 
obvious downside of shifting to them the risks that may arise out of 
contractual incompleteness issues in negotiating with NCE investors. This 
downside, however, should not be overestimated. The broader access to 
NCE capital that allows a waiver of the undivided loyalty principle would 
compensate shareholders for such risks. Additionally, as noted above, it is 
reasonable to assume that ex post renegotiation would be available to 
improve initial allocations of entitlements and increase gains from 
trading.
228
  
Further, the contracting positions of shareholders under this proposed 
reform should not be conflated with that of NCE investors under current 
rules. In contracting with the corporation (i.e., the board as shareholders’ 
representative), NCE investors start as “outsiders.” The concern is whether 
they will be able to acquire enough inside information to effectively 
protect their investment expectations. The appointment of constituency 
directors in the first place is an attempt to address this concern. In contrast, 
under this Article’s proposal, the board would bargain for contractual 
restrictions on a constituency director’s discretion from its privileged 
position as an insider, being naturally better placed to bargain for effective 
protection. Moreover, under the realistic assumption that the board would 
continue to include at least one shareholder-designated director, the 
shareholders would also benefit from continued access to internal 
monitoring of constituency directors’ actions.229 
1. Scope 
As concerns the scope of this Article’s normative proposal, two 
important caveats are in order. First, the waiver of loyalty this Article 
envisions would not apply to conduct of constituency directors that is 
plainly self-serving, such as transactions that advance a constituency 
 
 
 227. See supra text accompanying note 169. 
 228. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 229. See infra Part III.A.2. 
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director’s own interest at the expense of the interests of shareholders and 
designating investors, like extracting lavish private benefits. For example, 
imagine that a board controlled by constituency directors used the 
company’s money for regular private jet trips to the Augusta National Golf 
Club.
230
 Unless constituency directors could justify these expenditures 
based on business purposes, this proposed reform would still hold them 
liable for breach of the duty of loyalty.  
More generally, any director conduct that falls within the category of 
vertical agency problems—with the notable exception of 
conflict-of-interest transactions—would be excluded from the proposed 
waiver of loyalty. While the discussion has so far referred to vertical 
agency problems as exclusively pertaining to the shareholder-manager 
relationship, such problems translate to some extent to the 
shareholder-director relationship, since directors act as agents who 
exercise delegated corporate control on the shareholders’ behalf. The 
collective nature of board decision-making
231
 and the bonding mechanism 
provided by reputational concerns
232
 scale down the scope and intensity of 
vertical agency problems affecting directors as compared to managers, but 
they cannot completely eliminate such problems.  
As applied to constituency director issues, this means that there is room 
for purely self-serving director actions that should be excluded from the 
waiver of loyalty. Indeed, it is evident that extracting private benefits, 
paying out excessive compensation, taking cash out of the firm, and the 
like are all actions that damage designating investors and shareholders 
alike. With conflict-of-interest transactions, however, it might be difficult 
to tell self-serving conduct apart from conduct that is in the interest of the 
designating investors and only incidentally benefits constituency 
directors.
233
 In response, a bright-line rule would be useful to guide courts’ 
 
 
 230. Anecdotal evidence is full of such excesses. For example, Ross Johnson, the CEO of RJR-
Nabisco during the 1980s, allegedly “jetted-off to some far-flung golf club” almost every weekend. 
BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE FALL OF RJR NABISCO 79 
(1990). Johnson reportedly shared these benefits with his handpicked directors. See id. at 92–93. 
 231. See Bainbridge, supra note 55, at 32–38 (explaining that collective decision-making helps to 
constrain the agency problems that may affect board actions and, more generally, corporate 
relationships).  
 232. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The Prime Directive, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 
921, 928 (2007) (arguing that “the basic premise” that applies to a corporate director, as compared to a 
manager, is “that her reputation as a whole matters more than her position with a particular 
corporation”). In the case of constituency directors, “relational concerns”—arising from the personal 
or professional ties that such directors often have with their sponsors—add to reputational concerns in 
constraining the risk of board opportunism. See infra note 243 and accompanying text. 
 233. See Baird & Henderson, supra note 28, at 1314–15 n.26. Baird and Henderson suggest that 
courts should retain ultimate power to distinguish these cases. Id. When applied to contexts involving 
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ex post decision-making. This rule, for example, could mimic the 
exculpatory clause—included in most “interested director” statutes—that 
enables the validation of a per se conflicting transaction if approved by 
shareholder vote.
234
 In order to validate a per se conflicting transaction 
undertaken by constituency directors, approval by the designating 
investors could replace approval by the shareholders. Absent ratification 
by the designating investors, constituency directors would be liable for 
breach of the duty of loyalty.  
Second, the ability of corporate actors to opt out of the duty of loyalty 
should not be limited to startups and declining corporations. These 
corporate contexts are illustrative, rather than exhaustive, examples of 
corporate situations in which the duty of loyalty is likely to interfere with 
welfare-maximizing contracting practices. For example, the financial 
manipulation of an investor’s economic and control rights that has become 
increasingly common in today’s corporate environment may also alter the 
traditional understanding of an investor’s exposure to issues of contractual 
incompleteness. To the extent that “with the right package of derivatives, a 
debtholder can enjoy the same cashflow rights as an equityholder and vice 
versa,”235 the contracting problems these investors face may likewise trade 
places. More generally, corporate actors will tend to have private 
information about the desirability of the waiver of loyalty in a given 
corporate situation. For this reason, their ability to opt out of loyalty 
obligations should not be subject to context-specific restraints.  
2. Implementation 
It is important to emphasize that this Article’s proposal for reconciling 
party autonomy and corporate law does not involve a call for the extension 
of fiduciary duties to NCE investors. Thus, while this proposal shares the 
progressive idea that it might be efficient in some circumstances to take 
residual control away from shareholders and give it to other corporate 
 
 
constituency directors, however, this solution might potentially alter the parties’ desired allocation of 
entitlements, with the risk of re-posing the very same problems the appointment of such directors is 
designed to avoid. 
 234. While “interested director” statutes include a number of variations across the various states 
that have adopted them, their common core provides that a conflicting transaction can be ratified 
through (i) approval by disinterested directors, (ii) shareholder ratification, and (iii) proof of the 
transaction‘s fairness. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (West 2011). 
 235. Baird & Henderson, supra note 28, at 1311.  
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constituencies,
236
 it bears radically different positive and normative 
implications. 
From a positive perspective, the reason for allowing corporate control 
power to shift to NCE investors does not rest on any social responsibility 
argument but on the classic law and economics argument that legal rules 
should facilitate efficient corporate contracting.
237
 In other words, NCE 
investors’ ability to claim the exclusive loyalty of constituency directors 
does not follow from the attribution to the former of any special status, as 
progressives claim.
238
 Instead, it is the product of party autonomy, i.e., the 
allocation of entitlements to which both shareholders and NCE investors 
self-interestedly agree.  
From a normative perspective, the contractual underpinning of this 
view disentangles the attribution of corporate power from the entitlement 
to fiduciary claims. Modeling the director’s relationship with NCE 
providers on the ordinary relationship with shareholders, progressives see 
the entitlement to fiduciary claims as a necessary complement of the 
attribution of corporate power. This is because, under a conceptual 
framework that conceives of the position of investors as beneficiaries of 
board actions as a legal privilege, a claim for breach of fiduciary duty will 
commonly be an investor’s only cause of action against disloyal directors. 
Put another way, the attribution of corporate power to one or another type 
of investor would be an empty mandate absent an investor’s standing to 
bring fiduciary claims against corporate directors.
239
  
But when the attribution of power to NCE investors is 
re-conceptualized as the product of party autonomy, personal liability for 
breach of fiduciary duties is no longer a necessary ingredient to hold 
directors accountable. Designating investors have alternative means to 
mitigate the risk that constituency directors may not act in their interest, 
 
 
 236. The “progressive” (or “communitarian”) school of corporate law is centered on the idea that 
corporate law should require directors to serve the interests of all corporate participants rather than just 
shareholders. See, e.g., David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201 (defending a 
view of the corporation as a social institution tied to all its members by means of trust and mutual 
interdependence); Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing 
Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 630–43 (1992) (advocating that courts should 
extend to non-shareholders the right to sue directors); see also PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 
(Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995).  
 237. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 10, at 14–15, 20–21.  
 238. For progressives, this special status arises from the egalitarian claim that corporate 
participants are equal members of the same community of interests. See Millon, supra note 213, at 
1382–83. 
 239. See, e.g., id. at 1388 (arguing that a multifiduciary model of directors duties is necessary to 
implement a communitarian model of the corporation and make the otherwise frustratingly vague 
directors’ duty statutes effective).  
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whether because they engage in purely self-serving conduct or end up 
acting in favor of shareholders. For one thing, as long as designating 
investors are individuals rather than corporate entities, they may decide to 
directly sit on the board
240
 and therefore eliminate that risk altogether.
241 
Appointing constituency directors who share an ownership interest with 
their sponsors can achieve the identical result when the designating 
investors are instead corporate entities.  
More generally, designating investors can, and mostly do, choose their 
board representatives among individuals with whom they have a 
significant preexisting relationship. The classical example is the 
appointment of constituency directors who have an employment, 
professional, or other preexisting relationship with their sponsors.
242
 As 
long as appointed constituency directors place value on the continuation of 
their preexisting relationships with the designating investors, they will 
have no incentives to make corporate decisions that deviate from the 
investors’ desired course of action. To put this in economic terms, the 
contract between designating investors and constituency directors tends to 
have relational features.
243
 Hence, designating investors will generally be 
able to rely on self-enforcing mechanisms to constrain the risk of 
opportunistic behavior by their representatives. This does not exclude, 
however, the possibility that in some circumstances designating investors 
may employ specific contractual provisions to safeguard their interest 
vis-à-vis their board designees. What matters for the purposes of this 
 
 
 240. For example, this was the case of Joseph Prang, one of the directors in Trados and the owner 
of Mentor Capital Group LLC, which held one percent of Trados’ preferred stock. See In re Trados 
Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 1512-CC, 2009 WL 2225958, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 24, 2009).  
 241. One could object that actions by constituency directors who also are NCE investors could be 
“self-serving” in the sense described in Part III.A.1 above. Although this could be the case, this 
Article’s proposal would still provide an effective response. Where such conduct consisted in purely 
self-serving behaviors (e.g., private benefits extraction), NCE investors should not benefit from the 
waiver of loyalty. Instead, where it consisted in the undertaking of conflict-of-interest transactions, 
such transactions should be considered as implicitly ratified by the NCE investors with consequential 
application of the waiver of loyalty.  
 242. In Trados, with the exception of Joseph Prang, all the other board designees of the preferred 
stockholders had either an ownership or employment relationship with their designating investors. 
Trados, 2009 WL 2225958, at *2.  
 243. Relational contract theory examines contractual relationships by describing parties as repeat 
players who take into consideration the effects of their current actions on the future actions of their 
counterparties. The seminal contribution on relational contract theory is owed to the legal scholar Ian 
R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, 
and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854 (1978). In the most recent economic elaboration 
of this theory, a contract is defined as relational when, for each contractual party, continuation of the 
contract is more valuable than her outside option. See Jonathan Levin, Relational Incentive Contracts, 
93 AM. ECON. REV. 835, 839–41, 846 (2003). 
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discussion is that the combination of relational and contractual levers at 
the disposal of designating investors makes the recourse to fiduciary 
claims unnecessary to preserve their corporate control.  
While turning a director’s loyalty obligations into a default would not 
extend fiduciary claims to NCE investors, it would substantially modify 
shareholders’ fiduciary claims. For one thing, shareholders would no 
longer have the right to bring fiduciary claims against constituency 
directors. As discussed above, the only exception to this rule would 
concern a constituency director’s self-serving conduct, which would be 
excluded by the waiver of loyalty.
244
 However, shareholders would have 
the right to bring fiduciary claims against the incumbent board that 
negotiated the appointment of the constituency director if this action is 
finalized to advance the board’s self-interest, rather than the shareholders’ 
interest. While under the shield of the business judgment rule, 
shareholders could not challenge the merit of the incumbent board’s 
decision, they would be entitled to prove that this action constituted a 
breach of the incumbents’ duty of loyalty. For example, imagine that in 
the hypothetical from Part II.B.1, the decision of the board to opt for the 
refinancing strategy—and, therefore, the appointment of constituency 
directors—rather than the liquidation strategy was prompted by the 
incumbents’ interest in preserving continued access to private benefits 
from control.
245
 In this case, the shareholders would have a fiduciary claim 
against the incumbent board. 
Additionally, shareholders would always have a course of action 
against constituency directors for breach of specific restrictions on the 
exercise of residual control in favor of designating investors. For example, 
if the corporate charter included a provision requiring the approval of 
shareholders to implement a specified transaction where a conflict of 
interest arose, constituency directors would be exposed to liability if they 
went ahead with such a transaction absent shareholder approval.  
Finally, turning the obligation of loyalty into a default would also alter 
the scope of shareholders’ fiduciary claims vis-à-vis their designated 
directors in boards controlled by constituency directors. Because in these 
circumstances corporate decision-making power would rest with the 
constituency directors, the fiduciary obligations of shareholder-designated 
 
 
 244. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 245. This is the so-called “initiation problem” of bankruptcy: the problem arising out of a 
manager’s incentives to inefficiently delay liquidation of a company that no longer has any going-
concern value out of a fear of losing private benefits of control. See Alan Schwartz, A Normative 
Theory of Business Bankruptcy, 91 VA. L. REV. 1199, 1239–43 (2005).  
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directors would essentially consist of internal monitoring functions. In 
other words, a shareholder’s course of action against their own board 
designees would be substantially reduced to claims for the failure to 
carefully oversee the contractual restrictions that were placed on the 
exercise of a constituency director’s residual control. Instead, in 
corporations with a majority of shareholder-designated directors, not much 
would change, since shareholder-designated directors would continue to 
retain decision-making power subject to ordinary fiduciary restraints.
246
  
3. Feasibility 
There are a number of ways in which parties could be allowed to opt 
out of the obligation of undivided loyalty. For example, the waiver of 
loyalty could be provided on a statutory level, mimicking the requirements 
established by Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware Code, which allows 
corporations to eliminate (or limit) a director’s liability for breach of the 
duty of care through the inclusion in the corporate charter of an 
exculpatory clause.
247
 Similarly, corporations could be allowed to include 
a provision in their corporate charter to exculpate constituency directors 
from breach of the duty of loyalty to shareholders, with respect to both the 
disclosure of information to designating investors and conflicted decision-
making. 
As an alternative to statutory reform, the waiver of the duty of loyalty 
could be enforced at common law. To this end, courts should recognize a 
corporation’s express authorization of constituency director status—
whether through contract, bylaws, or corporate charter—and the waiver of 
loyalty implied by this status. As a practical illustration, under this 
Article’s proposal, the court in Trados should have granted the preferred 
designees’ motion to dismiss based on the waiver of the duty of undivided 
loyalty implied by these individuals’ appointment to the board. 
 
 
 246. The only relevant exception could arise in situations of conflicts of interest between the 
shareholders and the designating investors. In such situations, one could imagine, for example, that 
following the disclosure of a relevant contingency by a constituency director, the designating investors 
threatened to exercise a contractual discretionary power (e.g., acceleration) unless the board opted for 
a course of action in their favor. Under this Article’s proposal, shareholder-designated directors should 
be exculpated from breach of loyalty where they favored the preferred shareholders to avert the latter’s 
threat. This should hold true even where the relevant contingency was not included among those 
provided for by the contract as triggering the exercise of the preferred shareholders’ discretionary 
power. Indeed, the function of constituency directors is precisely to enable the state-contingent 
exercise of necessarily incomplete contractual protections.  
 247. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (West 2011). 
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B. Undivided Loyalty as a Default  
A possible objection to this Article’s proposal is that the goal it 
pursues—eliminating inefficiencies in current fiduciary rules—could be 
more effectively achieved by getting rid of fiduciary duties altogether. 
Under this alternative proposal, all corporate directors, regardless of their 
affiliation with one constituency or another, would “merely be obliged to 
honor the terms of the firm’s investment contracts . . . .”248  
While attractive, this solution suffers from two drawbacks. First, it 
overlooks the fact that the rationale for making shareholders the 
beneficiary of a director’s residual discretion through fiduciary duties—
i.e., contractual incompleteness—continues to apply to the majority of 
corporate situations. Indeed, acknowledging the economic significance of 
novel business models—such as models in which contractual 
incompleteness issues are likely to be as severe for shareholders as for 
NCE investors—is not the same as arguing that these models represent the 
majority of corporate contexts. Instead, shareholders are still likely to be 
the constituency that bears the most acute contracting problems in the 
majority of corporate situations,
249
 although the economic significance of 
these contexts has radically decreased.  
Second, proposals for eliminating fiduciary duties from corporate law 
misleadingly assume that these contractual incompleteness issues could be 
handled through the implied obligation of good faith, as is done with 
ordinary contracts.
250
 Under this view, the restrictions arising from the 
obligation to act in good faith in executing a contract would replace 
fiduciary restraints in preventing managers from opportunistically 
exploiting gaps in the shareholder corporate contract. But, while fiduciary 
protection is functionally similar to that offered by the contract doctrine of 
good faith, it is an analytical oversimplification to place them on equal 
 
 
 248. Baird & Henderson, supra note 28, at 1316. 
 249. This implies that shareholders remain the party who places the highest value on the 
attribution of fiduciary duties in the majority of corporate contexts. In these contexts, all parties are 
better off “if the shareholders are permitted to compensate . . . other constituencies—in the form of 
higher interest on bonds, higher wages to workers and managers, and better prices for suppliers and 
customers—for the right to have fiduciary duties flow exclusively to them.” Macey, supra note 45, at 
27. Thus, an argument exists for defending the obligation of undivided loyalty as the allocation of 
entitlements that corporate actors will still prefer in most corporate situations and which the law should 
therefore enforce as a default. See Eric Maskin, On the Rationale for Penalty Default Rules, 33 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 557 (2006) (providing a formal explanation of why default rules should be 
“nonpenalty,” i.e., specify outcomes that the parties want). 
 250. See U.C.C. § 1-203 (1990) (“Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of 
good faith in its performance or enforcement.”).  
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footing. As aptly observed by Victor Brudney, “the center of gravity of the 
fiduciary obligation is in the beneficiary's interests. In contrast, the center 
of gravity of the obligation of an arm’s-length contracting party is in its 
own, rather than the other party’s, interests.”251 Hence, on the one hand, 
conduct permissible under the obligation of good faith might not be 
acceptable under fiduciary law.
252
 On the other hand, fiduciary law 
systematically requires agents (directors) to sacrifice their own 
self-interest to the benefit of principals (shareholders) unless specifically 
allowed to act otherwise. A similar result is not replicable in arm’s-length 
relationships because the requirement to act in good faith is a reciprocal 
obligation of the contracting parties.
253
 Consequently, the effects of 
treating fiduciary duties and the implied obligation of good faith as 
substitute institutions are at best normatively dubious.  
CONCLUSION 
A defining principle of the canonical view of corporate governance, so 
often repeated in academia and judicial opinions, is that shareholders alone 
are entitled to the loyalty of directors. Instead, the rights of NCE investors 
are limited to those explicitly contracted for, on the assumption that these 
investors, unlike shareholders, can be fully protected by contract.  
This Article’s analysis of the role and function of constituency 
directors has exposed the inefficiency of this principle in today’s complex 
corporate environment. This principle gives only shareholders access to 
the residual control of directors. This limits the availability of 
welfare-maximizing contractual solutions that sit at the intersection of 
corporate and contract law. And it does so when those solutions are most 
needed. As this Article has shown, in some corporate contexts, such as 
startups and declining corporations, certain investments may be worth 
undertaking only where NCE investors can ensure the allegiance of 
directors on the board. In such contexts, allowing NCE investors to 
privately gain access to a director’s adaptive decision-making remedies the 
contract’s failure to provide such investors with adequate protection. Thus, 
 
 
 251. Brudney, supra note 166, at 631. 
 252. The classic characterization of the duty of loyalty by Justice Cardozo in Meinhard v. Salmon 
is paradigmatic of the more stringent requirements to which a fiduciary is held. Cardozo famously held 
that “[a] trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, 
but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.” Meinhard v. Salmon, 
164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). 
 253. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) (“Every contract imposes upon 
each party a duty of good faith . . . in its performance and its enforcement.”). 
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the rule that directors owe an undivided loyalty to shareholders hinders, 
rather than serves, shareholder interests and those of society as a whole. 
Given the increasingly blurry line that separates the contracting 
positions of shareholders and NCE investors, the choice of who benefits 
from the residual control rights of directors should be left to party 
autonomy. Under current doctrines, however, NCE investors are only 
allowed to carve out specific exceptions to a director’s obligation of 
undivided loyalty. This approach overlooks the fact that shareholders 
might be required to relinquish director allegiance as a whole to NCE 
investors in order to gain access to important sources of capital. For this 
reason, the obligation of undivided loyalty should be a default that 
corporate actors could opt out of by appointing constituency directors. 
This reform would eliminate the current inefficiency raised by this 
obligation, making the corporate pie bigger for all willing to share it.  
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